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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ALICE M. DONAHUE, BARBARA
D 0 N A HUE, and CONSTANCE
MARILYN DONAHUE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
WARNER BROTHERS PICTURES
DISTRIBUTING CORPORATION,
INTERMOUNTAIN
THEATRES,
INC., ARCH E. OVERMAN and C.
E. OVERMAN,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
7965

BRIEF OF~RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of facts set forth in the .plaintiffs'*
brief is substantially correct so far as it goes. It is, however, incomplete. It omits mention of certain procedural
steps which shed much light on the case and glosses over
*Throughout this brief, appellants are referred to as plaintiffs
and respondents are referred to as defendants, as in the trial court.
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most of the testimonial evidence. For this reason and because of the importance of the case, it is deemed necessary
to make a more· detailed statement than is contained in
plaintiffs' brief.

Procedural History
The original complaint in this case was filed in the
District Court of Salt Lake County on November 30, 1949
(R. 1-5). It alleged that the motion picture "Look for the
Silver Lining" depicted "the career and used the name of
Jack Donahue * * * without the permission * * *
of plaintiffs"; that "the said portrayal * * * [was]
in part true to life and in many parts wholly untrue," and
that as· a result of the exhibition of the film by defendants
"throughout the State of Utah and throughout the United
States," the plaintiffs as the "heirs" of Jack Donahue had
been "vexed and annoyed and humiliated and caused great
mental and physical suffering" to their damage in the sum
of $350,000.00. The complaint further asked for an injunction to prevent future showings of the motion picture
(R. 1-5). All of the defendants named in the original complaint were served· with process, except .Warner Brothers
Pictures, Inc., which later was dismissed out of the case on
motion of the plaintiffs (R. 91). After filing of the complaint, on petition of the defendants the case was removed
to the United States Districit Court for the District of Utah
(R. 10-22). The propriety of the removal was not challenged by the plaintiffs. Instead, after a motion by the defendants for a more definite statement had been granted (R.
52-54), the plaintiffs filed in the federal court an amended
complaint (R. 47-54).
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The amended complaint was similar to the original
complaint, except that it set forth in greater detail the
particulars in which the portrayal of Jack Donahue was
allegedly inaccurate (R. 49). The amended· complaint like
the original complaint claimed injury to the plaintiffs' feelings in that the exhibition of the film had "vexed and annoyed and humiliated" them to their damage. An injunction again was asked (R. 50-51). The amended complaint
also contained in paragraph 9 thereof, allegations, that the
plaintiff, Alice M. Donahue, had collaborated in WTiting a ·
manuscript portraying the true life and career of .Jack
Donahue which she had been prevented from selling by
reason of the p_rior exhibition of "Look for the Silver
Lining." There was no recital of injury or damage by
reason of these "property" allegations. The federal court
granted the defendants' motion .to strike paragraph 9 on
the ground it was immaterial and irrelevant to any purported cause of action based on an alleged violation of the Utah
right of privacy statute (R. 46). The defendants thereafter
filed separate answers to the amended complaint (R. 3845). Interrogatories were propounded by both sides (R.
29-32; 36-37) and answered (R. 33-35; 78-86), and the deposition of ~rs. Donahue was taken (R. 64-65). The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was heard and granted by the federal court on September
29, 1950 (R. 26).
The basis of the ruling of the fe9.eral court in granting
summary judgment was that: (a) The Utah right of
privacy statute, Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah
Code Anno. (1943), was invalid under state and federal con-
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stitutional guarantees of free speech and the press if construed as claimed by the plaintiffs. (b) The aforesaid statutory prohibition against the use of a name, portrait or picture of a deceased person for "advertising purposes or for
purposes of trade" was not applicable to the exhibition of
motion pictures. (c) Under the Utah conflict of laws rule
in tort cases, the substantive rights of the plaintiffs must
be determined by the law of the place of injury, which in
this instance was California where the plaintiffs at all times
resided and were physically present, and under the law of
California the plaintiffs were without remedy. In light of
the foregoing, the federal court held that on the basis of the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on file,
no genuine issue existed as to any material fact. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of each of the defendants
was entered (R. 26). From this judgment, the plaintiffs
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit.
The case was argued before the Tenth Circuit on three
separate occasions. The first hearing was held before three
judges of that Court. About a month later, a reargument
was ordered before the full court of five judges. Several
weeks later an opinion was handed down affirming the
lower court's judgment by three to two vote of the judges.
Upon plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, the case was set
down for reargument a third time, and in its final opinion
the Court reversed its previous position and entered a three
to two decision in favor of the plaintiffs (R. 24-25). The
final majority opinion and the dissenting opinion by Chief
Judge Phillips are reported at 194 F. (2d) 6; 15. In sub-

a
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stance, the majority opinion holds that: (a) The constitutional guarantees of free speech and press are applicable
only to publications which are essentially educational or
informative or purely biographical, and unless the motion
picture involved in this case comes within one of these
categories, it would be inhibited by the Utah statute. (b)
Motion pictures or other publications "based primarily
upon fiction or the imagination and designed primarily to
entertain and amuse an audience desiring entertainment
and willing to pay therefor" constitute· "trade" within the
meaning of that term in the Utah statute, and if "Look for
the Silver Lining" were a publication of that type it would
be prohibited by the Utah statute, as distinguished from a
publication of the type protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (c) On the basis of the allegations of
the plaintiffs' amended complaint, it could not be determined
as a matter .of law whether "Look for the Silver Lining" was
within the protection of free speech and the press as defined and limited by the Court or whether it was proscribed by the statutory prohibition against "trade" as
defined by the Court; therefore, it was decided that· the
case should be returned to the lower court for further proceedings. The majority opinion seemingly ignored the conflict of laws argument urged by the defendants. With reference to the ruling of the lower court in striking the "property" allegations of paragraph 9, the Court said that such
action was not error, since the allegations did not bear any
relevancy or materiality to any cause of action basea on
the Utah right of privacy statute.
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After the Tenth Circuit had returned the case to the
lower federal court, the plaintiffs made a motion to remand
the cause to the state court from which it originally had
been removed, on the ground that removal had been improvident · (R. 23). Defendants consented to the motion.
The federal court so ordered (R. 61). After remand, the
parties filed a stipulation and order signed by one of the
state court judges on June 14, 1952, ·in which it was provided that the pleadings and papers which theretbfore had
been filed in the federal court should be treated as if they
had been filed originally in the .state· court (R. 63-65). The
same stipulation and order provided that the action of the
federal court in striking the "property" allegations of
paragraph 9 should be adopted as the ruling of the state
court (R. 64).
Certain preliminary motions and arguments then were
heard and disposed of by the state court, including a denial
by the trial judge on August 13, 1952, of a motion by plaintiffs to further amend the amended complaint by adding
certain allegations pertaining to additional "property"
claims of plaintiffs (R. 67; 69) . Defendants, without objection, were granted leave to file amendments to their
answers setting forth counterclaims for a declaratory judgment (R .. 93). These counterclaims requested a declaratory judgment with respect to the defendants' right to
exhibit and re-~xhibit in Utah "Look for the Silver Lining" also other and similar type motion pictures portraying
deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue either factually or fictionally (R. 94-109). Plaintiffs filed a reply admitting substantially all of the allegations for declaratory
relief (R·. 110-111).
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The case proceeded to trial in the state court on No.vember 17, 1952. Testimony was heard for five days (R.
112-166), also the motion picture "Look for the Silver Lining" was·exhibited to the jury and trial court (R. 363-368).
At the conclusion of the evidence and after both sides had
rested, the defendants moved for a directed verdict, advancing substantially the same contentions with respect to the
construction of the Utah statute and the applicable conflict
of laws rule as they had urged throughout the case.· The
trial judge took the motion under advisement (R. 115)
and submitted the issues to the jury (R. 116). With re-.
spect to the construction of the Utah statute, the jury was
instructed (R. 151-171; 544-558) in accordance with the
views expressed in the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit. The jury returned a verdict of "no cause of action"
in favor of the defendants (R. 172). On December 16,
1952, the trial court overruled the plaintiffs' motion for a
new trial, and granted the defendants' request. for declaratory relief as prayed in their counterclaims (R. 175). In
the declaratory judgment (R. 179-181), the trial court
adopted views of the law contrary to the majority of the
Tenth Circuit, but consistent with the minority opinion of
Chief Judge Phillips.

Testimony at the Trial
The only witnesses called by the plaintiffs during the
trial were Mrs. Alice M. Donahue, the widow of Jack Donahue, and her two daughters, Barbara and Constance Marilyn. The two daughters were only seven and five years of
age, respectively, when their father died (R. 337; 354).
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Their brief testimony (R. 337-361) added nothing of significance to that of Mrs. Donahue's.
Mrs. Alice M. Ponahue testified as follows:
She was the widow of Jack Donahue (R. 206). She
and her daughters were residents of Los Angeles, California,
and had regarded California as their home since 1936.
Prior thereto they had resided in New York and Massachusetts (R. 214; 254). Until the time of the trial, they
had never been in Utah except to stay overnight at a motor
court on the way to their summer home at Cape Cod (R.
253).
Jack Donahue, whose real name was John James Donahue (R. 274), was born in Charlestown, Massachusetts
(R. 284). His father's name was Dennis; his mother's
name was Julia. He had a brother Joe and another brother
Walter. His sisters- were Margy and Alice (R. 274). Mrs.
Donahue first met Jack Donahue in 1910, when she was only
fourteen years of age (R. 275). Jack was then seventeen or
eighteen years of age (R. 275). Prior to their meeting,
Jack Donahue had done some dancing in vaudeville theatres
on amateur nights, but he had done no professional dancing (R. 207; 275). She had done amateur ballet dancing,
but had had no professional engagements (R. 207). Alice's
mother advertised in the Boston Globe for a dancing partner for Alice and Jack answered the ad. Thereafter they became a dancing team. During their first few engagements
they danced under the name of "Scott and Duprey" (R.
207). Later they used their own names of "Donahue and
Stewart" or "Stewart and Donahue" (R. 208). As indi-
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cated by the scrapbooks, Exhibits 1-8 incl., they toured
the country as a dancing and comedy team from 1910 to
1920, and intermittently from 1920 to 1925 ( R. 208 ; 250251). Alice and Jack were married April 6, 1911, the year
following their first meeting (R. 208). They had three
children. Alma, the first child, was born in 1920 (R. 209).
Barbara was born in 1922. Constance Marilyn was born
in 1925 (R. 213). Since filing of the present lawsuit, Alma
had died (R. 194).
Jack Donahue first played in a Broadway show in
"Kitchy-Koo" in 1918-1919. He next had a part in "Angel
Face" and in the "Ziegfeld Follies" of 1920 and 1921 (R.
218). In 1921-1922 he played in "Two Little Girls in
Blue" and starred in a dancing and comedy part in "Molly
Darling" (R. 219). He appeared in "Be Yourself" in 19241925. In ·1925-1927, he co-starred with Marilyn Miller in
"Sunny" at the New Amsterdam Theatre (R. 220). He next
starred with Marilyn . Miller in "Rosalie" (R. 221). In
both "Sunny" and "Rosalie" Jack Donahue played a dancing
and comedy part (R. 246). Jack Donahue was co-author
with Fred Thompson of the show "Sons 0' Guns." He
wrote his own scenes and starred in the show during the
season of 1929-1930 (R. 222). Jack Donahue died October
1, 1930, at the age of 38 years (R. 223) . At the time of his
death he was regarded as one of the top dancing-comedian
entertainers of his day ( R. 243) .
Mrs. Donahue and her daughters saw the motion picture "Look for the Silver Lining" at a preview showing at
Beverly Hills Theatre in Los Angeles on March 15, 1949
(R. 244; 251). They saw the motion picture only on that
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one occasion (R. 225) . They regarded it as an attempted
portrayal of the life and character of Jack Donahue (R.
334). It was produced and exhibited without their consent
(R.: 95).
"Look for the Silver Lining" is principally the story
of Marilyn Miller. Jack Donahue is really a secondary
character (R. ~16). The motion picture shows Marilyn
Miller dancing as a child in an act called the "Five Columbians" (R. 231; 317). Later she becomes a star on Broadway and appears in such well-known productions as "Sally"
and· "Sunny." Scenes from these productions are reproduced in "Look for the Silver Lining" (R. 317). The part
of Marilyn Miller is played by June Haver and the part of
Jack Donahue by Ray Bolger (R. 226) . According to Mrs.
Donahue, the motion picture is untrue in its portrayal of
Jack Donahue, except that Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue did star together in "Sunny" and "Rosalie" and Jack
Donahue was a dancer (R. 228).
I

In Mrs. Donahue's opinion, Jack Donahue is shown
in the picture as brash, forward and self-confident, whereas in fact he was shy and diffident (R. 229-230). The
motion picture shows Jack Donahue meeting Marilyn Miller in 1913 or 1914, when she was a young girl with the
"Five Columbians." In fact, Jack Donahue and Marilyn
Miller didn't meet until they started rehearsing for "Sunny"
in 1925 (R. 232). The motion picture shows Jack Donahue
and Marilyn Miller dancing on the stage of a night club in
London in 1913 or 1914. Also in the same sequence, Jack
Donahue is shown exhibiting a picture of his baby daughter
to Marilyn Miller. According to Mrs. Donahue, Jack Don-
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ahue never danced at a night club in London (R. 230) and
at that time he had no children (R. 231). Jack Donahue did
go to London in 1923 and spent four weeks there. Mrs. Donahue did not go with him (R. 329), and therefore she could
not say from her personal knowledge whether or not he
went to a night club ( R. 329) .
Another thing Mrs. Donahue objected to in the motion .
picture was that it indicated a great friendliness between
Jack Donahue and Marilyn Miller. In real life, however,
the friendliness was of such a nature that the Donahue's
youngest daughter was christened Constance Marilyn, after
Miss Miller (R. 314). As a publicity stunt Marilyn Miller
acted as godmother at the christening (R. 314). They all
went to a church and posed for newspaper J>ictures. A
newspaper photograph of the event is contained in one of
the scrapbooks, Exhibit 3. But it was just a publicity
stunt and more fictionalization. A proper christening ceremony was performed later (R. 315). The motion picture
makes hardly any reference to Jack Donahue's home life
(R. 335). It does indicate that at one point in her career,
Marilyn Miller had a romantic attachment for Jack· Donahue. But then Jack Donahue in the kindest way tells her
that he is happily married, that.he thought everybody knew
it, and he shows Marilyn a picture of his baby girl and invites her to come and see his family (R. 335). Mrs. Donahue admitted that this scene constituted the only reference
in the motion pictur~ to Jack Donahue's home lifE} (R.
335) and there was nothing in that scene which unfavorably reflected on it (R. 336).
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Mrs. Donahue agreed that in real life Jack Donahue
was a merry and happy person. He would give encouragement to another young artist (R. 318). He frequently was
referred to as "The Man with the Laughing Feet" (R.
319), and as one of the foremost dancers and comedians of
his time (R. 319). In real life, Jack Donahue was a
friendly, sincere, and understanding person ( R. 320) . He
was devoted to the stage and to his art, and spent his whole
life trying to become a success (R. 321). In real life, Jack
Donahue was a very charming man (R. 321). One of his
great qualities was his kindness (R. 321). He had the ability to captivate audiences and project a glow of warmth
across the footlights (R. 321-322). He had a capacity for
friendship and loyalty (R. 322). He also was a person of
imagination and was good at improvisations (R. 323).
He earnestly applied himself to his work in the "show
must go on" tradition (R. 324). Mrs. Donahue conceded the
foregoing qualities of personality were important (R. 324).
She wouldn't agree, however, that these qualities of personality would be the really important things in· any portrayal
of Jack Donahue (R. 324-325). Furthermore, she did not
think that "Look for the Silver Lining" portrayed Jack
Donahue as possessing any of these characteristics (R.
320...324).
Before Mrs. Donahue ever had seen "Look for the Silver ·Lining" she consulted with her attorney, Mr. Louis
Blau of Los Angeles (R. 252). Mr. Blau was an associate
of Mr. Chester Smith, who was in the courtroom assisting
Mr. Arnold Rich in the trial of the case (R. 251). Mr.
Blau thought it would be a good idea if she and her daugh·
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ters went to see the motion picture, so they did ( R. 252) .
They were terribly upset ( R. 324), humiliated and distressed by the movie (R. 235; 255). In leaving the theatre,
they felt like little dogs running out. The thing that seemed
so terrible was the way they were ignored (R. 235). No
one spoke to them in the lobby except a man connected with
Warner Bros. by the name of B. S. DeSylva (R. 235). Until she saw the motion picture at the Beverly Hills Theatre
on March 15, 1949, her feelings had not been hurt by the
portrayal of Jack Donahue (R. 257; 259). It was when
she saw the picture that her feelings were hurt (R. 257258). Neither Mrs. Donahue nor her daughters ever had
seen "Look for the Silver Lining" in Utah (R. 225) . She
first learned it had been exhibited in Utah from Mr. Preston D. Richards, another one of her attorneys. Mr. Richards came to see her at her home in Los Angeles (R. 247).
So far as the hurt to her feelings were concerned, she never
had picked out any particular states in which to measure
her hurt, except California and Utah. She didn't know why
she had picked out Utah (R. 258). She had no knowledge
of any particular exhibition of the motion picture in Utah
by any of the defendants named. She just knew in a general way that the picture had been exhibited in Utah (R.
273). Mrs. Donahue didn't think that she could limit the
hurt to her .feelings to the boundaries of any particular
state (R. 262). The damages asked in her amended complaint were based upon the hurt she felt as a result of the
exhibition of the motion picture throughout the United
States and throughout the world (R. 262; 265-266) . The
prayer for damages referred to all exhibitions of the mo-
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tion picture, including the exhibition at the Beverly Hills
Theatre in Los Angeles which she and her daughters had
witnessed (R. 265). It was upon seeing the picture in California that she felt the most acute shock to her feelings
(R. 265).
Mrs. Donahue and Jack Donahue wrote a book entitled Letters of a Hoofer to His Ma. They collaborated,
even though Jack Donahue's name was used as author (R.
215). The chapters that made up the book were serialized
in the Cosmopolitan Magazine during Jack Donahue's lifetime. After his death, Mrs. Donahue put the material together in book form and arranged for its publication (R.
215; 276). The book concern~ a dancer and comedian
named Jack Donahue, who does eccentric dancing (R. 277).
In the book, as in fact, Jack Donahue has a father by the
name of Dennis (R. 277), brothers by the name of Walter
and Joe, and a mother named Julia · ( R. 278) . Also, as in
real life, the Jack Donahue portrayed in the book came
from Charlestown, Massachussetts, and the names of places
where he performed were the actual places where Jack
Donahue did perform (R. 278). At the beginning of each
chapter or letter in the book is a date and a program. These
dates and programs were taken from the actual programs
used at the places where Jack and Mrs. Donahue appeared
(R. 280). However, the incidents. contained in Letters of
a Hoofer to His Ma are fictional (R. 277). For example,
the reference in the book to how Jack Donahue's father
liked his whiskey are fictional (R. 278). The same is true
of the episodes in which Jack Donahue becomes romantically involved with girls possessing foreign accents (R. 279).
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The book also refers to an incident at the old Howard
Theatre, a burlesque house in Boston, involving Jack Donahue's father, his brother Joe, and certain gag lines concerning the "smallness" of his father (R. 281-282). This
did not actually occur ( R. 283) , even though the same·
monologue was used by Jack Donahue in some of his stage
performances (R. 290). As in the book,. Jack Donahue
often fictionalized himself and his life (R. 327) . He fre-,
quently ridiculed himself in order to get laughs· ( R. 328) .
During his lifetime, Jack Donahue wrote for the Saturday Evening Post (R. 215), including an article entitled
"Ad Libbing" which appeared in the issue of October 5,
1929, and an article entitled "Hoofing'' published on September 14, 1929 (R. 285) . Mrs. Donahue collected data
and did the research work for these articles (R. 215;
285) . The articles purport to refer to the personal history
of Jack Donahue and his dancing career. Some of the incidents related therein are true and some are untrue (R.
285). Articles of this sort were used for publicity purposes (R. 286; 288). In the article "Ad Libbing" it is not
true as stated therein that Jack. Donahue ran away from
home at an early age, that he joined Dr. Zurega's traveling
medicine show, that he toured the country with the medicine
show doing dance routines and eventually was brought
home by a truant officer (R. 286-287) .. Neither is it ·true
as reported in the article that Jack Donahue played with
a stock company at Muff, Utah, or that he toured the country doing solo dancing ( R. 289) . It is true as stated in the
article that Jack Donahue's father worked in the Navy
Yard at Charlestown (R. 290), and that his father opposed
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his son's stage ambitions (R. 288). It is true also that Jack
Donahue did perform a monologue in which he made uncomplimentary jokes about his father (R. 290-291). Also
the portion of the article telling about the Broadway shows
in which Jack Donahue appeared is true (R. 295). Even
though the article purports to be actual experiences of
Jack Donahue, it is largely fictional. Jack Donahue was
just trying to be funny (R. 289). The same situation exists
in connection with the episodes related in the article "Hoofing" (R. 293-295).
In 1943, Mrs. Donahue and a Miss Pulsifer collaborated
in writing a biographical synopsis of Jack Donahue's life.
The synopsis, finished in 1944, purported to portray Jack
Donahue's life and career (R. 301). The manuscript as
originally written was registered and the incidents contained therein concerning Jack Donahue's life were accurately set forth (R. 301; 304). However, after the present
suit had been filed and Mrs. Donahue's deposition had been
taken in February, 1950, the manuscript was rewritten and
revised (R. 305). The first twenty-three or twenty-four
pages of the revised manuscript are fictional and were
added for the purpose of creating interest in Jack Donahue's
life (R. 301-302; 305; 327). This was done because they
could not get any interest in the registered version (R. 305) ·
The fictional material added by Mrs. Donahue and Miss
Pulsifer was taken in part from the Saturday Evening Post
articles (R. 301). The revised synopsis was prepared with
the idea that it eventually might be made into a screen play
(R. 326). Through her agent, Mrs. Donahue attempted to
interest various motion picture companies in the revised
version of the manuscript (R. 306) . Her agent submitted
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it to various motion picture companies ( R. 302) . The manuscript was admitted in evidence at the tri~l as Exhibit 12
(R. 190).
Mrs. Donahue conceded that in the manuscript she
had written, in the articles which Jack Donahue himself
wrote, and in the interviews which Jack Donahue gave out
to newspaper reporters and writers, his life and career were
continuously fictionalized (R. 308; 314). He frequently
represented that he had done single vaudeville around the
country during his early career, which was not true (R.
325). He frequently represented himself as having danced
in burlesque, which was not true (R. 328). In the scrapbooks, Exhibits 1-8, and in various newspaper articles many
references are made to experiences in Jack Donahue's life,
which are _purely fictional. This continued even after his
death. For example, the New York Times of October 2,
1930, carried an article announcing Jack Donahue's death
(R. 306). The obituary refers to· Donahue's part in a
traveling medicine show, his participation in specialty
numbers between acts of plays by the young Adams Repertoire Troupe in Chicago, and to his acting in burlesque
stock before moving into vaudeville. This was all untrue
(R. 307-308) .
According to Mrs. Donahue, show business is the great
world of make-believe (R. 333). It is common among public entertainers for them to fictionalize episodes in their
lives (R. 314). Jack Donahue continuously conformed to
this pattern. He thought such representations were amusing (R. 309; 314), that they added color, glamor and interest to his career (R. 309). In order to appear funny, both
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Jack Donahue and Mrs. Donahue assumed all kinds of crazy
poses and did all sorts of crazy antics and often had their
pictures taken in these poses. These pictures frequently
· were published in the newspapers, as indicated by the scrap.
books (R. 310). Mrs. Donahue, herself, created quite a
sensation for those days by wearing tight trousers in one
of their acts (R. 311). There were many unfavorable comments about it. The act was termed "crude" by some
people (R. 311). The London newspaper in Canada referred
to her as unnecessarily vulgar and suggestive (R. 311).
She and Jack Donahue also had a stunt termed a "shirt..
tail gag" (R. 312). But Mrs. Donahue and her husband
were show people and were used to taking the bad with the
good. Among the things they were especially concerned
about was that their . names and act be kept before the
public and that they should attract public notice. They
wanted their act and their personalities well-known (R.
313).
.

I

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the defendants
called as witnesses, Professor Walter Prichard Eaton, Dr.
Lorin F. Wheelwright, Professor Lilla Belle Pitts, Dr.
Mark May and Mr. Eric Haight. All of these witnesses
testified to the educational and informative value of "Look
for the Silver Lining." The motion picture, itself, also was
shown to the court and jury (R. 363-368).
Professor Walter Prichard Eaton testified as follows:
For many years he was dramatic critic for The New
York Tribune, The New York Sun, and The American
Magazine (R. 472). From 1919 to 1922 he was lecturer in
dramatic criticism at the School of Journalism, Columbia
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University. He had lectured on the history of the American
theatre at summer schools from Harvard and Columbia and
the University of Iowa to the Utah State Agricultural College at Logan, Utah. In 1933, he succeeded George Pierce
Baker as Professor of Playwrighting at Yale .University (R.
472). Since his retirement at Yale in 1947, he has taught
courses· in playwriting and American dramatic history at
the University of Texas, University of North Carolina, and
Rawlins College, Florida ( R. 4 73). He has written two or
three collections of dramatic criticisms, also a book entitled
The Actor's Heritage, another entitled The History .of the
Theatre Guild for the First Ten Years, and a textbook The
Drama in England. He also has written quite a number of
plays for radio and television, including . "Queen Victoria"
which was produced on Broadway (R. 470).
When one speaks of playwriting, the m<?__tion pict~re is
included since the motion picture is really the dramatic
medium of today. If a motion picture does not have the
same dramatic structure as a play, it will not succeed· (R.
474). As a teacher and dramatic critic, he would classify
"Look for the ·silver Lining" as a biographical play about
the life and times of Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue
(R .. 474-475). Of course_, there is no such thing as a biographical.play in the scientific sense (R. 4 75). No historical or biographical play ever has been written which did not
contain some fictional elements. "Anthony and Cleopatra"
would be classified as a biographical play, though Shakespeare knew nothing about either of them (R. 492). It is
doubtful that either Anthony or Cleopatra spoke in blank
verse in real life (R. 490). If a biographical play has noth-
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ing in it but absolute, accurate facts, practically all dialogue
would have to be eliminated. You cannot have a play unless the characters speak, and that means the writer has
to make up the conversation. The moment you start to
write an historical play, you start to write fiction and
nothing else can be made. out of it (R. 4 75). The goal of
the dramatist is to make the conversation typical of the
person involved (R. 475-477). Another problem of the
playwright. is the necessity to condense. In writing a biographical play, dramatic episodes covering many years
have to be com pressed into the length of a play. A play
must have a beginning and an ending; it has to
move forward and carry the interest of the audience. To
accomplish this certain episodes must be compressed and
others invented. The writer of a biographical play or motion picture has the constant problem of how much he must
alter facts and juggle dates in order to make an effective
story (R. 476-477).
That parts of the motion picture "Look for the Silver
Lining" may be fictional would not change its classification
as a biographical play (R. 478). The only pertinent question is ~hether the motion picture contains so much fiction
that it alters the underlying purpose of the play. The underlying purpose of "Look for the Silver Lining" is to depict an era (R. 478). In this, the motion picture reasonably well resolves the dramatic problems which confronted
its authors (R. 479) . The fictionalized parts were necessary. For example, the motion picture shows Marilyn
Miller joining her family on the stage when she is about
fifteen years old. In fact, she did so when she was only
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five years old. The reason for the change is obvious.· No
adult actress could play a five year old at the beginning of
the picture and create any illusion. Another change is the
introduction of Jack Donahue in the motion picture long
before he actually did meet Marilyn Miller. Why is t~is?
Because he is the second most important person in the play.
If he were not introduced until he actually did meet Marilyin Miller when they began rehearsals for "Sunny," more
than half the motion picture would be over before Jack
Donahue's appearance. You would say, "Where did this
........... stranger come from?" So he is brought into the story early,
in violation of actual chronology, in order that the audience
may meet him, get to know him, see him dance, and feel
something of his quality when the play swings toward its
climax (R. 480). So far as Jack Donahue is concerned, he
is shown in the motion picture as a real person. The purpose
of the portrayal is to represent the kind of man that he was.
Whether he went to London in 1914 or 1923 is utterly unimportant. The important thing is whether the portrayal
shows the same kind of a person as the real Jack Donahue.
Was he a kind soul? Did he have twinkling feet? Is he a
person who mak~s us feel warm and good when we see
him? These important things the motion picture correctly
represents (R. 492).
In Professor Eaton's opinion "Look for the Silver
Lining" would be of educational value to college students
(R. 481). It illustrates phases of early vaudeville. It shows
the development from vaudeville to the musical comedy revue of the 1920's. By seeing "Look for the Silver Lining"
a student of the American Theatre would get a feeling of
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what that period was like. It is historically educational to
see that at the same time F. Scott Fitzgerald's flaming
youth were swallowing bathtub gin, the delightful and
wholesome Jack Donahue was captivating the rest of the
people. If one is studying the American Theatre, "Sally"
and "Sunny" are not the most important things in it, but
they are part of the picture. ,Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue were the top performers on the musical comedy stage
_ of their day. "Look for the Silver Lining" in its portrayal
of these two outstanding personalities is a kind of antidote
to a great deal of the books and criticisms of that era (R.
482). Like Mark Sullivan's history of Our Times or Fred
Allen's book concerning the First Fifty Years of Life in the
Nineteenth Century, "Look for the Silver Lining" tells of
the songs that people of that time were singing and of the
places and plays people were attending (R. 483).
The creation and exhibition of a play or motion picture is not considered a matter of '~trade" by authors,
critics or anyone familiar with the drama (R. 485). The
production of a play or motion picture is regarded as an
artistic accomplishment. The writer or composer is giving
out to the public his idea or conception of something in life
(R. 487). When the creation is completed, the artist turns
to something else. The object o~ trade is something like
Campbell's soup ,that is reproduced over and over again
(R. 497). For instance, there is a product known as Prince
Albert Tobacco. Stamped on each can is a picture of Prince
Albert in his whiskers and long frock coat (R. 488). Clearly, that is the use of a picture of an historical character for
the purposes of trade and advertising. In contrast, in the
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play "Victoria Regina" in which Helen Hayes had such an
enormous success two or three years ago, there were several
episodes about the same Prince Albert with the same whiskers and the same long frock coat. Certainly, the author
of "Victoria Regina" did not regard himself as engaging in
trade when he wrote that play (R. 489) .
When Salt Lake City was only thirteen years old and
still a tiny hamlet in the desert, the people working and
toiling together created a perfectly beautiful theatre, the
old Salt Lake Theatre. It was the finest buildings of its kind
west of the Rocky Mountains and accoustically the best in
America. For eight or ten years there were no railroads and
no traveling stock companies were able to come to Salt Lake,
so the people organized their own company and gave plays
and charged admission. Finally, the railroad arrived and
the traveling stock companies could get to Utah, and then
Booth and Barrett and all the great actors and actresses of
America came to Salt Lake. But did anyone believe that
what went on in that beautiful old theatre was trade?
(R. 500) . Not at all. The people believed, as Brighp,m
Young had said, that the dramatic entertainment of a people
was just as important to their health and happiness as their
religion (R. 500). A person who makes a play or a motion
picture and the person who exhibits it and charges admission therefor is a purveyor of a kind of spiritual food.
You can't call that "trade" by any common understanding
of the word (R. 501).
Professor Eaton recalled having met Jack Donahue
personally and having seen him perform in several of his
Broadway successes (R. 484). On the basis of his personal
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observation, he thought the Jack Donahue portrayed in
"Look for the Silver Lining" was quite similar to the Jack
Donahue .of real life. He thought Ray Bolger's dancing
approximated the charm and twinkle of the real Jack
Donahue extraordinarily well (R. 484).
Dr. Lorin F. Wheelwright testified as follows :
He graduated from the University of Utah with a
major in music and a minor in educational psychology.
He received a Ph.D. from Columbia University, where his
doctor's thesis had to do with the reading of music (R.
369; 373). Alexander Schreiner and Edward P. Kimball
trained him as an organist (R. 370). He was the Director
of the Arts Division of the Utah Centennial Commission and
Production Manager of the musical play "Promised Valley" (R. 371). From 1936 to 1949, he was Supervisor of
Music in the Salt Lake City Schools (R .. 371). On behalf
of the Philosophical Library of New York he wrote a chapter dealing with the use of films in music education in the
book Films in Education. Since and during his connection
with the Salt Lake City Schools, he has served as Chairman
of the Audio Visual Aids Committee which previews motion pictures for use in the city schools (R. 374).
Dr. Wheelwright has viewed "Look for the Silver Lining" (R. 375) and in his opinion it has definite educational
values (R. 376). In nearly all schools today, there are expensive auditoriums built mainly for the purpose of per·
mitting students to stage operettas and other dramatic presentations. "Look for the Silver Lining" has a direct bearing upon the required skills and ideals of good showmanship
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(R. 377). It gives an acquaintance with productions as they
take place -on Broadway under original settings. Excerpts
from musical productions such as ''Sally" and "Sunny"
give the student a chance to better visualize what his job
is in school productions (R. 400). ''Look for the Silver
Lining" teaches what hard work show people must go
through in order to achieve excellence in their profession.
It emphasizes the necessity for rehearsal (R. 378). It
portrays the ideal that success is never won alone, but
must be shared (R. 380) ; that success is a joint responsibility and a joint reward (R. 381). It adheres to the ideal
that human affection is something to cherish (R. 381). It
illustrates that friendship is the result of the sincerity of the
individual in his interest toward others (R. 381). The
characterization of Jack Donahue in the film shows a man,
who though an expert entertainer, is the personification of
friendship and courtesy (R. 381). Another ideal of human
affection shown in the film is the marital relationship,
which is treated on a hfgh class basis (R. 385). It illustrates
also the necessity for self-confidence, without which one
fails in the theatrical business as in other aspects of life
(R. 379). Another teaching is that the audience must be
pleased (R. 379). The picture shows the necessity of good
communication from the actors to the audience. Not only
is there good speech, but clean articulation in the musical
and dancing rhythms (R. 387).
One of the basic elements of good showmanship is that
every drama in order to be interesting must portray conflict. Conflict is usually of three kinds : ( 1) Man against
man. (2) Man against his fate, the thing he cannot control.
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(3) Man against himself, that which he could become or
wishes to become. "Look for the Silver Lining" portrays
all three of these types of conflict (R. 388-389). It is
beautifully put together and expresses a unity from begining to end. The musical theme helps tie the picture
together. The characterizations are consistent through.
out. It gives proper emphasis where needed. The
film has coherence (R. 390), and by the use of such de.
vices as "the dissolve" and "the montage," the action of the
play moves forward and keeps the audience fascinated.
Furthermore, the action and characterizations are plausible (R. '391).

In additionto the elements of good showmanship taught
by "Lqok for the Silver Lining," it helps to acquaint people
with an important period of American culture· (R. 399).
The film shows the historical transition of show business
from the vaudeville, to the revue, to the light opera (R.
377). It gives an acquaintance with the musical culture
of a certain period in American life (R. 400). It acquaints
people with productions such as "Sally" and "Sunny,"
which are part of the literature of America (R. 404). It
shows good orchestration when it is well performed. It
. shows singers singing under certain conditions. It shows
how a solo performance is worked into an ensemble (R.
400) .. It gives an acquaintance with historical personalities
such as Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue (R. 399).
The film does not lose in educational value because of
its fictional elements (R. 394). In the art of story telling
there are broad meanings which are more significant than
critical details of fact (R. 395). When one is talking about
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the honesty of Abraham Lincoln, the exact details of the
various stories about Lincoln which illustrate this quality
are not important ( R. 396) . So in "Look for the Silver
Lining'' events covering many years are compressed into
several short scenes. This is done to convey the essential
meanings of all the events of the period covered (R. 392).
So too, in the portrayal of Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue, certain dramatic license is taken to establish their
personalities and accentuate their characteristics. It is
unimportant when Jack Donahue met Marilyn Miller, but
it is important that when he met her his attitude was one
of respect and courtesy (R. 382; 397). Fictionalizing in
drama or motion pictures also is justified in order to create
greater interest and audience appeal (R. 421). One of the
fundamental tenents of education is that interest must be
aroused in the learner in order for him to learn ( R. 423424). For a film to have value in the educational field it
must have audience appeal (R. 423). Whether a film has
commercial value is beside the point, so far as its educational purpose is concerned. Shakespeare wrote many great
plays that have commercial value and bring in money at the
box office. Such plays likewise have a very substanthd
educational value (R. 423).
The schools of Salt Lake City constantly use and exhibit feature length film such as "Look for the Silver Lining" for educational purposes as part of their curricula.
Comparable films that have been shown are "A Hundred
Men and a Girl" starring Deanna Durbin and the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, also the motion picture "They
Shall Have Music" featuring the violinist J ascha Heifitz
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(R. 402). In Dr. Wheelwright's opinion "Look for the
Silver Lining" is in the same category as these films (R.
403).
Professor Lilla Bell Pitts testified as follows :
Her business is the teaching of teachers. She is Professor of Music Education at Teachers College, Columbia
University _(R. 431). She has served as Supervisor of
Music in the schools of Amarillo, Texas, Assistant Supervisor of Music in the schools of Dallas, Texas, and teacher
of music in the Junior High Schools of Elizabeth, New
Jersey (R. 432) .' She has been a visiting Professor of
Music at various universities throughout the United States,
including Brigham Young University at Provo, Utah.
While at B. Y. U. she helped to write a state course of music
study for the elementary schools of Utah (R. 432). At
present she is engaged in writing a series of twenty-five
to thirty music books for use in the schools. The project
includes books for use from kindergarten through senior
high school ( R. 433) . The grade school books already have
been completed and are now in general use in all the schools
throughout the United States (R. 433). She also has written a book on junior high school music called Music Integration in the Junior High School and a book entitled Music
Curriculum in the Changing World ( R. 433) . She is past
president of the National Music Educators' Conference (R.
434) and a member of the Music Teachers' National Association (R. 435). She has written a handbook concerning the
use of motion picture films in music education (R. 437)
entitled Sixteen Millimeter Films for Musical Education
(R. 438). Among other things, the handbook informs
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teachers where films are available and how they can be
used. For example, it lists five different places in Utah
where films can be obtained ( R. 465) . She is Chairman
of the Music Committee of the National Music Educators'
Conference which reviews and selects music films for use
in the schools. In this capacity she saw a screening of
"Look for the Silver Lining" ( R. 439-440) .
She is not being paid to testify in this case ( R. 465466), but came as a representative of the Music Educators'
National Conference. This organization is eager to foster
the use of all available enriching material to carry out its
major purpose, which is to broaden the base of music education. The influence of motion pictures is so tremendous
in its reach and the strength of its appeal that she has given
a great deal of time to doing what she can to disseminate
information on how films can be used to educational advantage (R. 466) . If films of the quality of "Look for the
Silver Lining'' can be made available to the schools, it will
be a distinct enrichment to the stock of teaching materials
(R. 466). She has found that motion picture films are
almost frighteningly influential as a media of education
(R. 439).
In the opinion of Miss Pitts, "Look for the Silver Lining" is definitely educational (R. 441). She feels that the
motion picture has a range comparable to Til Eulenspiegel,
a story concerning a character of the Middle Ages put to
music by the late Richard Strauss. The representations and
legends built around this medieval comedian are comparable
to the era portrayed in "Look for the Silver Lining" (R.
447). The film also is in the same category as Wagner's
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opera The Meistersinger about Hans Sachs. In the days
of the masters and the guilds, Hans Sachs was a master
musician who really lived, and he influenced young people
to write music from the heart rather than from precept
(R. 447). In like manner "Look for the Silver Lining"
represents a periQd of development in theatrical musical
comedy (R. 461). Even though the two outstanding figures concerned in that development, Marilyn Miller and
Jack Donahue, rpay not be portrayed with strict accuracy
from the standpoint of chronology and conjunction of epi~odes, they are- truly portrayed as representative of that
period of cultt1re (R. 462).
In the opinion of Miss Pitts "Look for the Silver Lining" is an historical motion picture from the standpoint
of the era depicted ( R. 446-447) . . There are elements of
reality in it which are true to the spirit of the times (R.
44 7) . The fact that the film fictionalizes certain incidents
in the life of Jack Donahue does not impair its educational
value (R. 444). Marilyn Miller and Jack Donahue were
outstandingly influential in the period. from 1920 to 1930.
Their portrayal in the film is symbolical of the era and
gives color, point and focus to the film. "Look for the Silver
Lining" also teaches something which it is important for
people to know, namely, that culture comes from people and
not from supernatural sources (R. 444). In other respects,
the film shows the development from the episodic variety
shQw and vaud~ville, lacking any sort of unity and coherence, to the beginning of something that can be called drama
with music in the more closely coordinated musical comedies of "Sunny" and "Sally" (R. 442). "Look for the Silver
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Lining" indicates what is occurring and what is likely to
occur in the future from the standpoint of historical per-.
spective: That if we ever have real native opera in the
country, it is likely to have its roots in the popular entertainment field of music rather than in external sources or
European models ( R. 443) .
Music is primarily expressed through the human voice
and the body. It is important for us to recognize that a
dancer has something to say that is of cultural value. Jack
Donahue as portrayed in the film, not only has something
to communicate as a performing artist, but he also uses
comedy as it has been used since the days of the ancient
Greeks (R. 444). As a social commentary, it is a salutory
influence in bringing wit and humor to bear on human
frailties (R. 445). It helps to remind us that we are all
amateurs in the business of living (R. 445).
In 1925, Professor Pitts recalls having seen Jack Donahue perform in "Sunny." In comparing that performance
with Ray Bolger's dancing in "Look for the Silver Lining"
she had difficulty realizing she .wasn't seeing the same
thing she saw in ~925 (R. 448). The spirit and feeling of
the dancing of both Donahue and Bolger are the same (R.
463).
Dr. Mark May testified as follows:
He is Professor of Educational Psychology at Yale University, a member of the Connecticut State Board of Ed..
ucation, and of the American Council on Education. He
also is Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission
on Information, which is the citizens' commission which
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works with the Department of State in respect to the Voice
of America and other information sent overseas (R. 502).
For fifteen years he has been Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Teaching Film Custodians, Inc., a non-profit
educational corporation of New York (R. 504).
The purpose of Teaching Film Custodians is to select
and make available .motion picture films for use for educational purposes. It utilizes films produced by the motion
picture companies for the theatre (R. 514). It usually gets
these films within from one to two years after their national release (R. 515). The twelve-man Board of Directors
of Teaching Film Custodians consists of a list of the leading
educators of the United States (R. 503-506). Selection of
films is made by committees of teachers appointed by the
National Educators' Conference. At present there are seven
such committees, for example, a Committee on English, a
Committee on Social Studies, and a Committee on Music.
Professor Lilla Belle Pitts, who previously testified, is the
Chairman of the Committee on Music. Each of the seven
committees has the responsibility of selecting films which
in its judgment have educational value in the teaching of
the subject which that particular committee represents (R.
506). Teaching Film Custodians deposits its films in some
nine hundred educational libraries located throughout the
United States (R. 508). In Utah, deposits are located at
the Bureau of Visual Education of the Salt Lake City Pub·
lie Schools and at the University of Utah (R. 519). The
films are available to any teacher for a nominal rental.
Available films include both short subjects and excerpts
from the so-called feature length films .(R. 507).
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Dr. 1\'Iay has seen "Look for the Silver Lining" and
in his opinion the motion picture is definitely of educational
and informative value (R. 509). This also was the opinion
of the Music Committee, headed by Professor Pitts, which
reviewed the film. That Committee expressed a desire for
the film (R. 517-518), and therefore Teaching Film Custodians requested it from Warner Brothers. That
Company has confirmed the fact that Teaching Film Custodians may have and use the film. The next step is the
editing of the film by the Music Committee (R. 512; 517518). It is the intent and desire of Teaching Film Custodians that this particular film be distributed along with
its other educational films as soon as possible (R. 512).
Mr. Eric Haight testified as follows :
He is a director of Encyclopedia Britannica Films and
President of its wholly owned subsidiary, Films, Inc. Encyclopedia Britannica Films is the leading producer of
pedagogical films, sometimes referred to as documentary
films, in the world (R. 521-522). Films, Inc. is the largest
distributor of feature length films for use in educational
purposes (R. 522). For many years the two organizations
were independent, but they now have joined forces because
it was felt that the two types of film complement each
other and make it possible to offer a complete film program
to American educational institutions (R. 523) . The primary function of Films, Inc. is the distribution of feature
films to schools, universities, and other educational groups
(R. 523-524). Films, Inc. differs fr·om Teaching Film Custodians in that the former uses the entire feature length
film instead of just excerpts (R. 531). Usually, Films, Inc.
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gets the feature films within six months of the national release date (R. 533).
Representatives of Films, Inc. have reviewed "Look
for the Silver Lining" (R. 527-528). The film was considered by them to be suitable for use as an educational film
and a request has been made for the film (R. 528). If the
request is granted, Films, Inc., intends to distribute the
film, without cutting (R. 531), to schools and educational
institutions throughout the country (R. 535). In Utah,
Films, Inc. distributes its feature films through the Deseret Book Company (R. 525). Much of the business done
in Utah is with the Wards of the "Mormon" Church and
therefore all the films deposited with the Deseret Book
Company are first screened by the L. D. S. Screening Council (R. 525). "Look for the Silver Lining" has been screened
by this Council and unanimously approved (R. 528).
The gteat interest in feature films in the educational
field is due primarily to the· fact that motion pictures have
been found to be the most effective media of communication in dredging up the basic attitudes held by students.
The adolescent becomes emotionally involved while witnessing a particular film and because of that involvement his
basic attitudes and feelings are revealed. Frequently these
attitudes and feelings prove to be a shocking surprise to
the. curriculum supervisor who has thought the student
was learning something entirely different ( R. 523) . Another reason why the motion picture is such a forceful
medium of communication is that when you look at it,
without realizing, you tend to identify yourself with the
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character portrayed and the a~tion taking place on the
screen. So that when a child comes out of these vica·rious
experiences, he frequently has changed behavior patterns
and new attitudes towards social problems ( R. 529) . This
has been forcefully demonstrated with such motion pictures
as "Pinky" or "No Way Out" or "Gentlemen's Agreement."
Unknowingly, after seeing pictures of this type, thousands
of persons have rededicated themselves to the American
way of life, because they have identified themselves with
an experience of a very simple order in a motion picture
(R. 530).
Mr. Haight was not paid for coming to to Salt Lake
City to testify (R. 520). He came because i/t seemed shocking to him that it should be questioned whether the motion
picture should be entitled to the same recognition and protection as a medium of communication and expression, as
newspapers and books (R. · 520; 539-540).
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Before proceeding with the main points of defendants'
argument, several preliminary observations should be made
with respect to certain of the plaintiffs' contentions. At
several points in their brief, the .Plaintiffs refer to what
they consider to be inconsistencies in the trial court's rulings, particularly in comparing the trial court's instructions to the jury with its rulings on the declaratory judgment. In the light of the procedural history of the case,
the action of the trial judge not only was understandably
proper but probably exceedingly wise. As heretofore pointed
out, when this case was in the federal courts, the Tenth ·
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Circuit finally handed down a three to two decision in favor
of the plaintiffs at the conclusion of its third hearing. Although the defendants were convinced that the views
expressed in the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit were incorrect, nevertheless ~hese views constituted
the only judicial expression that existed with respect to the
construction of the Utah statute at the time of the trial in
the state court. Since the opinion of the Tenth Circuit was
concerned solely with the problem of construction of a state
statute, it in no sense was controlling so far as the state
courts of Utah were concerned. In the words of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, such decisions by federal courts involving
the construction of state statutes in the light of constitutional considerations constitute nothing more than "preliminary guesses." Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323
U. S. 101, 65 S. Ct. 152; Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 S. Ct. 643; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U. S. 582, 66 S. Ct. 761.
Still, in the absence of any other authority, it naturally has
some persuasive effect. And so in instructing the jury
during the trial in the state court, the trial judge understandably adopted the views set forth in the Tenth Circuit's
majority opinion with respect to the construction of the
Utah statute, and submitted the issues in accordance with the
theories therein outlined. In so doing, the trial court obviously chose to follow the most conservative course open
to it. In fact, the parties somewhat anticipated this action
by trying the case in the state court largely on the basis
of the theories and assumptions previouslY: announced by
the majority of the Tenth Circuit.
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In their motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion
of all the evidence (R. 5.:12-543) and in their requests for
a declaratory judgment (R. 94-109), however, the defendants reiterated the arguments 'vhich the majority of the
Tenth Circuit had rejected. By the time the case had
reached the state court, these arguments had been greatly
reinforced by the decision in Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S.
495, 72 S. Ct. 777, decided subsequent to the opinion of the
Tenth Circuit. The Burstyn case held for the first time
that motion pictures, as such, were entitled to the constitutional protection of free speech and the press. But it
was not until after the jury's "no cause of action" verdict
and the declaratory judgment aspect of the case had been
reached, that the trial court finally decided to adopt the
defendants' contentions with respect to this phase of the
law as it affected the construction of the Utah statute (R.
179). The conclusions of the trial court were arrived at only
after full argument and mature consideration of the whole
case in the light of the evidence and of the Supreme Court's
recent pronouncement in Burstyn v. Wilson, supra.
It is true that the rulings of the trial court on the
declaratory judgment are inconsistent with the legal theories and instructions on the basis of which the case was
submitted to the jury. If the trial judge had adopted the
views expressed in i~s declaratory judgment- earlier in the
case, it undoubtedly would have granted the defendants'
motion for a directed verdict. Also, the trial court properly might have excluded as immaterial the abundant evidence introduced by the defendants as to the educational
and informative value of the film. Out of an excess of
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caution, however, the trial court resolved all doubts in favor
of the plaintiffs and submitted the issues to the jury in accordance with the plaintiffs' theories of the law as contained
in the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit. As far as the
damage phase of the lawsuit is concerned, the jury's verdict
ends the matter. Under no conceivable circumstances could
the plaintiffs hope for more than the trial court allowed
them, that is, a submission of the issues to a jury in accordance with the majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit.
The problem of construction of the Utah statute lingers
on this appeal primarily because of the rulings of the trial
court on the declaratory judgment.
At no time in this case hav.e the plaintiffs raised any
question as to the propriety of the defendants' counterclaims ~eeking a declaratory judgment. The Court may
be interested to know, however, that ample authority for
the requests for declaratorY. relief is found in Gray v. Defa,
103 Utah 339, 135 P. (2d) 251, 155 A. L. R. 495, annotated
at 507-509, and Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. '359, 63 S.
Ct. 1115. In this important case, the plaintiffs and the
defendants both are anxious to secure a definitive ruling
from this Court with respect to the proper construction of
the Utah law.
J '

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I

"7

THE UTAH STATUTE MUST BE CONSTRUED
TO AVOID AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESULT.
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POINT II
THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST
USES "FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES OR
FOR PURPOSES OF TRADE" DOES NOT APPLY TO THE EXHIBITION OF MOTION PICTURES.
POINT III
THE ERRATIC AND DECADENT FORMULA
DEVISED BY THE NEW YORK COURTS IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
POINT IV
THE UTAH STATUTE IS A CODIFICATION .
OF A LIMITED RIGHT OF PRIVACY-PERSONAL IN NATURE.
POINT V
THE UTAH CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE
REQUIRES
PLAINTIFFS'
SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHTS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW
OF CALIFORNIA.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH STATUTE MUST BE CONST;RUEP
TO AVOID AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESULT.

In their amended complaint (R. 47-51), on the basis
of which the trial proceeded in the atate court, the plaintiffs
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asked that all future exhibitions by the defendants of the
motion picture "Look for the Silver Lining" be enjoined,
also for general and exemplary damages for all past exhibitions, because of the fact that their written consent had
not been first obtained to use the name of Jack Donahue in
the film. This extraordinary claim to the power of life
or death over the exhibition of a motion picture film is allegedly derived from the provisions of Sections 103-4-8 and
103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. (1943). According to plaintiffs, the statute confers upon them absolute and unrestrained authority to prohibit, in any theatre where an
admission is charged, the exhibition of any motion picture
which uses the name, portrait or picture of their deceased
ancestor, without their _prior written permission.
Throughout the proceedings in this case, the defen, dants consistently have maintained that any such interpretation of the state statute would constitute a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression expressly guaranteed by the
state and federal constitutions, and necessarily would render
the statute invalid.
At the time this argument was presented to the United
States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, and the opinion of
that Court was announced, there existed no definitive holding that motion pictures were entitled to the constitutional
protection of free speech and press. In fact, except for
dictum in United. States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U. S. 131, 166, 68 S. Ct. 915, 933, the existing authorities were to the contrary. Mutual Film Corp. v. In·
dustrial Comm. of Ohio,, 236 U. S. 230, 35 S. Ct. 387, and
Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. (2d) 665.
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Notwithstanding these precedents, however, the Tenth Circuit in part at least did accept the defendants' contention.
The majority held that the state statute would constitute
an objectionable restraint upon the freedom of speech and
the press to the extent that it forbade the publication or
exhibition of a motion picture which was essentially educational or informative or purely biographical in nature
(194 F. (2d) 13). But on the basis of the particular allegations in the plaintiffs' amended complaint, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that it could not say as a matter of Ia w
whether "Look for the Silver Lining" was sufficiently educational or informative_or biographical to come within the
constitutional protection as thus defined. According to the
Tenth Circuit's definition, only publications of an essentially educational or informative or purely biographical
character came within the aegis of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The decision of the Tenth Circuit indicated that the
issue of whether a particular motion picture was ed ucational or informative or biographical had to be determined
in each case as an issue of fact. So, at the trial in the sta:te
court, the trial judge submitted that issue to the jury, even
though the evidence introduced by the defendants as to the
educational and informative value of the film was unc9ntradicted (R. 368-541). In its Instruction No. 3, the trial
court told the jury it must find that the motion picture "is
essentially educational or informative in character" before
it could conclude that the film came within the constitutional exemption (R. 156; 548). Plaintiffs' only exception
to this instruction was based upon lack of evidence to
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justify it, not that it improperly stated the law (R. 560).
In view of the verdict, it must be presumed that the jury
found as a fact that "Look for the Silver Lining" was essentially educational and informative. So far as the plaintiffs' complaint for damages is concerned, this finding is
dispositive of the case.
The problem continues here by virtue of the defendants'
counterclaims for a declaratory judgment with respect to
their future right. to exhibit and re-exhibit in Utah "Look
for the Silver Lining" also other and similar type motion
pictures containing both factual and fictional portrayals
of deceased public figures such as Jack Donahue, without
the prior consent of the heirs (R. 95, 101, 106). In this
connection, . the defendants make the contention that the
portrayal of a prominent deceased public figure such as
Jack Donahue is protected by the constitutional guarantees
of free speech and press, without the necessity of an evaluation by a jury of the specific educational or informative
or biographical character of each film. In other words,
the defendants' position is that the constitutional protection is substantially broader than that recognized by the
Tenth Circuit for only essentially educational or informative or purely biographical publications.
Perhaps some excuse for the Tenth Circuit's narrow
definition of the scope of free· expression may have existed
at the time of its majority opinion, but all doubts were
swept aside by. the United States Supreme Court when it
reversed the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in
_Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, and in the
same opinion discarded the vestigial remnants of Mutual
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Film Corporation v. Industrial Commiss'ion of Ohio, supra.
In the Bu1·styn decision, the Supreme Court said :

"* * * [T] he present case is the first to
present squarely to us the question whether motion
picture~ are within the ambit of protection which
the First Amendment through the Fourteenth, secures to any form of speech or the press.
"It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are
a significant medium for the communication of ideas.
They may affect public attitudes and behavior in a
variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of
thought which characterizes all artistic expression.
The importance of motion pictures as an organ of
public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they
are designed to entertain as well as to inform. As
was said in Winters v. People of State of New York,.
333 U. S. 507, 510, 68 S .. Ct. 665, 667.
'The line between the informing and the
entertaining is too elusive for the protection of
that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through
fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine.'
"It is urged that motion pictures do not fall
within the First Amendment's aegis because their
production, distribution, and exhibition is a large
scale business conducted for private profit. We cannot agree. That books, newspapers, and magazines
are published and sold for profit does not prevent
them from being a form of expression, whose liberty
is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We fail
to see why operation for profit should have any
different effect in the case of motion pictures.
"It is further urged that motion pictures possess a greater capacity for evil, particularly. among
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the youth ·of a community, than other modes of expression. Even if one were to accept this hypothesis,
it does not follow that motion pictures should be
disqualified from First Amendment protection. If
there be capacity for evil it may be relevant in determining the permissible scope of community control, but it does not authorize substantially unbridled
censorship such as we have here.
"For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
expression by means of motion pictures is included
within the free speech and press guaranty of the
First and Fourteenth ·Amendments. To the extent
that language in the opinion in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission, supra, is out of
harmony with the views here set forth we no longer
adhere to it.

*

*

*

*

*

"The statute [of New York] involved here
* * * requires that permission to communicate
ideas be obtained in advance from state officials
who judge the content of the words and pictures
sought to be communicated. This Court recognized
many years ago. that such a previous restraint is a
form of infringment upon. freedom of expression
to be especially condemned. Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625.
* * *"
The factual situation involved in the Burstyn case is
interesting. It concerned the exhibition in the State of New
York of the film entitled "The Miracle" produced in Italy
by Roberto Rossellini. The story involved a demented young
girl who was a goat-tender. One day she was approached
by a bearded stranger whom she fancied to be St. Joseph.
After plying her with wine, the stranger ravished her.
Thereafter the girI returned to her village and discovered
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her pregnancy, which she decided was due to the "Grace
of God." She was persecuted and shamed by the villagers.
Finally, after many hardships and great pain her baby was
born. The experience filled her with joy and tender light.
The story thus portrayed was regarded by many as a
parody of the biblical account of the immaculate conception.
It created great controversy and a plethora of favorable
and unfavorable comments among religious groups. Finally
the Board of Regents of the Educational Department prohibited further exhibitions of the film on the ground that
it was "sacrilegious." The action was based upon a state
statute which permitted the Board to ban any film considered "obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious,
or of such a character that its exhibition would tend to
corrupt morals or incite to crime * * * ." In reversing
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court held the statute invalid, stating that it created a censorship constituting an infringement of freedom of ex. . . pression to be especially condemned. Gelling v. Texas, 343
U. S. 960, 72 S. Ct. 1002, reached a similar result. There
a local Board of Censors of the City of Marshall, Texas,
had denied permission for the exhibition of a motion picture on the authority of an ordinance permitting such action
when the Board was of the opinion that the picture was
"of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests
of the people of said -city." On the authority of Burstyn,
the Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid as a prior
restraint on freedom of expression.
It is respectfully submitted that the type of censorship so emphatically condemned in Burstyn and Gelling
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is indistinguishable from that imposed by an interpretation
of the Utah statute in the manner claimed by plaintiffs in
this case. According to plaintiffs, the Utah statute authorizes the absolute prohibition of all exhibitions of any motion
picture containing a portrayal of any deceased relative, on
the mere whim of the heirs' consent. Any exhibition without such prior permission would render the exhibitor liable
to punitive dam~ges and guilty of a criminal offense. As
thus interpreted, the statute not only vests unlimited powers
of censorship in a vague and nebulous group denominated
as "heirs," but it creates an effective prior restraint against
any portrayal through speech or the press of any deceased
person. It is inconceivable that the Utah legislature intended such a result.
In the light of the Burstyn and the Gelling cases, it is
impossible to accept the narrow definition of the scope of the
constitutio~al guarantees set forth in th~ majority opinion
of the Tenth Circ~it. Burstyn makes clear that the rule of
free expression protects not just educational or informative
material, but also material deemed by many to be "sacrilegious." It protects not only expressions of political and
social doctrine, but also "the subtle shaping of thought
which characterizes all artistic expression." It protects not
only biography, but also fiction. It protects not only material which informs, but also material which entertains
and is conducted for profit. It protects not only high class
literature, but also salacious publications in which the
Supreme Court could see nothing of any possible value to
society (Winters v. People of State of New York, 333 U.S.
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507, 68 S. Ct. 665) . It protects not only expressions of a
high moral tone, but also material which possesses a "capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community.",
In their brief, the plaintiffs seek to escape the force of
···· the Burstyn decision by arguing that "Look for the Silver
Lining" is interdicted by the Utah statute because it was
exhibited for box office profits. Because of this, say the
plaintiffs, the constitutional provisions have no application.
The difficulty with this argument is that it was expressly
considered and rejected by Burstyn. The Supreme Court
. stated:
"It is urged that motion pictures do not fall
within the First Amendment's aegis because their
production, distribution, and exhibition is a largescale ·business conducted for private profit. We
cannot agree. That books, newspapers and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression, whose
liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment. We
fail to see why operation for profit should have any
different effect in the case of motion pictures."
Plaintiffs also urge thai because a motion picture is
fictionalized and used for entertainment it falls outside
of the pertinent constitutional provisions. This argument
likewise was considered and rejected in Burstyn, not only
because the story o~ the "Miracle" film is itself fictional
but also by reference to the Court's earlier decision in Winters v. People of State of New York, supra. In the latter
case, the Supreme Court considered and declared invalid a
state statute under which a bookdealer was convicted of
selling ma8"azines containing vulgar stories of crime, blood-
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shed and lust. The Court held that even publications of
such a cheap and fictional nature were entitled to the constitutional protection, stating:
"The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic
right [a free press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one
man's amusement teaches another's doctrines.
Though we can see nothing of any possible value to
society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature."

One of the basic irrationalities of the plaintiffs' factfiction dichotomy in its relationship to free expression is its
false assumption that all matter which is not absolutely
factual is of no value to the public. The inaccuracy of such '
an assumption is indicated in Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.
S. 146, 157-158, 66 S. Ct. 456, 462, where the Supreme Court
in a case concerning free press and mail classification
stated: "What i~ good literature, what has educational
value, what is refined public information, what is good art,
varies with individuals as it does from one generation to another. * * * From the multitude of competing offerings the public will pick and choose. What seems to one to
be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring
values."
It is not here urged that there are no limits to the
constitutional protection of free speech and press. But the
limits are well defined and narrowly limited. As stated in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572, 62 S.
Ct. 766, 769, these limitations include "the lewd and ob-
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scene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fight' ' ing' words - those which by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
And in recent times, these limitations have been said to include communications of such serious and substantial evil
as to endanger or threaten the overthrow of the government
by force. Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 71 S. Ct.
857. The Supreme Court also has refused to extend the
constitutional protection to the distribution in the streets of
purely commercial advertising handbills. Valentine v.
Christensen, 316 U. S. 52, 62 S. Ct. 920. But freedom of
expression is the rule, not the exception. Only in exceptional situations have the limitations been recognized. In the
light of the First Amendment's history and of the decision
in Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625,
anyone claiming a limitation to the rule of freedom of expression has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the limitation asserted presents a really excep~ional case. So far as
the unrestricted prohibition claimed for the Utah statute
in the present case, it is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state properly may
carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests·
of society. In the words of Chief Justice Hughes in the
Near case: "The fact that the liberty of the press may be
abused * * * does not make any the less necessary the
immunity of the press from previous restraint * * *"
.
And state statutes restricting expression, even when justified by an actual danger, must be narrowly drawn and not
broader than necessary to meet the recognized evil. Feiner
v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 320, 71 S. Ct. 303, 306; Nie-
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Maryland, 340 U. S. 268, 271-272, 71 S. Ct. 325,

327; Cantwell
Ct. 900, 905.

v.

Connecticut, 310 U. S. 206, 307-8, 60 S.

The ·prior restraint and unbridled censorship imposed
by the Utah statute (if construed as plaintiffs contend)
i~ brought to special focus when applied, as in the present
case, to fictional publications concerning deceased public
figures. If the statute should be construed as prohibiting
.the fictional portrayal of' deceased public figures the practical, every day results of such a construction would be disastrous· to ·the cultural and intellectual life of the people of
Utah. Necessarily the statute would have to be regarded as
a previous and unreasonable restraint on the freedoms of
speech and the press provided by tpe state and federal constitutions.
Since time immemorial, the portrayal of the famous
dead in fictional as· well as factual form has been an essential part of our culture and one of the most vital and
important forms of free expression. It must be remembered
that our culture is a product of the generations that have
gone before us-of those who are now dead. Accordingly,
thinking and writing about the dead represent a great and
substantial part of our culture. Science, to a large extent,
is the work of those who have preceded us. History and
religion are essentially the story and the experiences of
those who have lived before us. Law and philosophy are
largely the work of men who are long dead. The greatest
and most precious part of our literature and of our art are
the creations of bygone generations. It is in these formsscience, history, law, philosophy, literature, art--that our
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culture expresses itself. Thus our culture necessarily deals
with the works and careers of the dead-particularly the
famous dead.* In so dealing with the famous dead and their
works, we may deal with them factually, as in science, history, law and philosophy. However, in literature and the
arts-.the graphic as well as the literary arts-we deal with
the dead not only factually but also fictionally, not only in
actuality but also in the imagination. Both factual and fie. . . tional publications concerning the noted figures who have
gone before us are an essential part of our culture, and the
unrestrained right to continue such publications is necessary for the survival of that culture in the form in which
we now know it.
Practically all jurisdictions which have given recognition to a common law right of privacy have taken pains to
emphasize that the right does not extend to publications
concerning public figures. As set forth in the Restatement,
Torts, Section 867, Comment (c), such persons necessarily
are "subject to the privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes,
villains and victims." Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed. 280, 282;
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 200,
50 S. E. 68, 72; Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. (2d) 704, 211
P. (2d) 320; The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 215
(Warren and Brandeis, the creators of the right of privacy,
expressly recognized the public figure concept as an excep*In a recent issue of the Saturday Review of Literature (October
27, 1951) there is a leading article by R. R. Spencer, M. D., entitled
"Staying Alive," in which it is stated (p. ·42) :
"Man is the 'knowledged ape,' the only talking animal, the
only tool-maker, the only time-binder; that is, the only animal
capable of binding into his own experience the experiences and
wisdom of those who lived in times long past."
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tion to the right). What is true of living figures within
the public eye is even more true of the famous dead.

i

i

If the plaintiffs' contention concerning the construction of the Utah statute should prevail, the cultural blight II i
that would descend upon the State of Utah would be too grim
to contemplate. It would mean that no plays, novels, paintings and other forms of artistic expression, which contain
any fictional reference to a famous deceased person, could
II II
be published in Utah without the previous written perI I II
mission of the deceased's heirs. The practical effect of such
a prohibition would be to stifle the cultural life of the community. The custom of portraying famous deceased persons
in works of fiction and in fictional situations is at least as
old as the ancient Greek theatre. It is found, for example, jll
in the plays of Aeschylus and Aristophanes in which famous
personalities, then :but recently deceased, were portrayed
under their own names in fictional situations. A work as
celebrated as Plato's Dialogues is essentially the portrayal
in fictional situations of the then recently deceased famous
personality of Socrates. Another striking example is the
depiction, under their own names, but in fictional scenes,
of famous deceased persons in Dante's Divine Comedy.
Shakespeare too, followed this custom. The roster of the
famous dead who, under their own names, perform their
fictional roles in Shakepeare's works, begins with such
remote figures as Julius Caesar and ends with Henry VIII,
who, in Shakespeare's time was practically a contemporary
figure.
\

:

JJI

I

1

In modern times portraying deceased public figures
fictionally is one of the most common forms of artistic ex·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

53

~

pression in the novel, the drama, in paintings, and in motion
pictures. It would be difficult to name a famous figure
of ancient, medieval or modern times who has not been
portrayed fictionally in such a work. In Appendix A attached to this brief is a list of titles of a few of the motion
pictures, plays, and novels in which the famous dead have
been portrayed fictionally. In Appendix B are set forth
excerpts from two distinguished works: (a) A Guide to
the Best Histo1·ical Novels and Tales by Jonathan Nield
(Elkin Matthews & Marrot, London 1929), and (b) A
Guide to Historical Fiction by Ernest A. Baker, M.A., D.
Lit. (The MacMillan Company, New York 1914). These
extracts contain the views of Carlyle, Lord Morley, Charles
Reade a-nd Henry Seidel Canby on the significance of the
historical novel in which the famous dead make their fictional appearances. These extracts also contain the considered views of two such distinguished students of literature as Mr. Jonathan Nield and Dr. Ernest A. Baker,
concerning the significance and value to our ~ulture of
publications in which famous dead people are recreated in
fictional situations. The clarity with which their views are
expressed and the acuteness of perception which these learned scholars have brought to this particular subject cannot
possibly be improved upon. Probably no better exposition
exists concerning the cultural importance of publications in
which the famous dead are fictionally portrayed.
Most of the works listed in Appendix A and thousands
of others like them have been· published, produced or performed in one form or another in the State of Utah. But if
the construction of the Utah statute for which the plain-
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tiffs contend were allowed, the potential liabilities and
damage suits created thereby would be literaily incalculable.
How many thousands of heirs of the famous dead would be
able to bring suit for how many millions of dollars, because someone had published, produced or exhibited in
Utah, some fictional work dealing with a famous deceased
person? Plainly, the situation which the plaintiffs propose
would be an impossible one. In Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho
and Nevada (and for that matter in the rest of the
United States) such publications would be a desirable part
of the community culture. But in Utah, publication of such
works would render the publishers and exhibitors guilty of
a criminal offense and subject to unlimited liability in punitive damages. In a very literal sense, Utah would become
as a "cultural desert."
The consequences of the plaintiffs' proposed construction of the Utap statute are strikingly illustrated by Chief
Judge Phillips of the Tenth Circuit by the reference in his
dissenting opinion to the well known novel The Soul of Ann
Rutledge, by Bernie Babcock. This boolr depicts the romance of Abraham Lin·coln and Ann Rutledge and the affect
that the untimely death of Ann Rutledge had upon the molding of Lincoln's character. In connection with this book,
eminent Lincoln historians are divided in their opinions concerning the authenticit~ or significance of the theory propounded in this book. Some believe that the romance of
Lincoln and Ann Rutledge occurred historically approximately as represented in the book. While others believe that
the story of the relationship between Lincoln and Ann
Rutledge to be purely fictional and hardly more than a myth
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or a "lie."* But who is to determine whether this
~ lei fine novel is or is not "informative and educational" or that
~ ~~" it contains "fiction and untruths" and therefore ought to
be suppressed in the State of Utah? Certainly not the
"heirs" of Abraham Lincoln, and certainly not the "heirs"
of Ann Rutledge.
As Carlyle has said (Appendix B hereof), the historical novels "have taught all men this truth * * * that
the bygone ages of the world were actually filled by living
men, not by * * * abstractions of men." Accordingly,
a "work of fiction * * * gives the historical student
a bird's-eye view where previously his sight has been obstructed -by details," and in the words of Henry Seidel Canby, "fiction and history are interchangeable." This, it is
submitted, is the answer to plaintiffs' attack on fictional
expressions of speech and the press, whether contained in
The Soul of Ann Rutledge or in Look for the Silver Lining
*Writers Who Accept the Ann Rutledge Part of the Lincoln Story
Carl Sandburg: Abraham Lincoln The Prairie Years-Robert E.
Sherwood: Abe Lincoln In Illinois-E. P. Conkle: Prologue to Glory
-Nicolay & Hay: Abraham Lincoln-Nathaniel W. Stephenson:
Lincoln-Ward H. Lamon: The Life of Abraham Lincoln-Edgar
Lee Masters: Ann Rutledge in Spoon River Anthology-Bernie Babcock: The Soul of Ann Rutledge--/rving. Bacheller: A Man For The
Ages-D. J. Snider: Lincoln and Ann Rutledge-H. W. Gammans:
Spirit of Ann Rutledge-Lloyd Lewis: New Light on Lincoln's Only
Romance (New York Times Book Review) Feb. 11, 1945-T. Morris
Longstreth: Tad Lincoln-William H. Herndon & Jesse W. Weik:
Herndon's Lincoln-Wilma Francis Minor: Lincoln The Lover (Atlantic Monthly, issues Dec. 1928 to Feb. 1929).
Writers Who Reject or Doubt the Ann Rutledge
Part of the Lincoln Story

Montgomery S. Lewis: Legends_ That Libel Lincoln-Emanuel
Hertz: The Hidden Lincoln-Josiah G. Holland: The Life of Abraham Lincoln-James G. Randall: Lincoln The President-Albert J.
Beveridge: Abraham Lincoln 1809-1858-Paul M. Angle: A Shelf
Of Lincoln Books-Roy P. Basler: The Lincoln Legend-Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th Edition under "Abraham Lincoln" page 139.
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or in any fictional work in which deceased public figures
are portrayed.
Moreover, under plaintiffs' contention that a deceased
public figure may not be portrayed with any degree of fictionalization, what is to be done about most of the famous
paintings of American history? Take for example Emanuel Leutze's "Washington Crossing the Delaware." Concerning this picture, it is stated in The History & Ideals of
American Art, by Eugen Neuhaus, Professor of Art in the
University of California (Stanford University Press, 1931),
at page 141:
"Much has been written and said regarding the
picture on the question of its historical veracity.
The charges that it was painted abroad and that the
shores of the picture are not those of the Delaware
but those of the Rhine are all petty criticisms which
cannot discount the fact that the picture is an excellent academic composition, admirably balanced,
possessed of much dignity, and full of a spirit of
adventure. Its theatrical qualities are undesirable,.
but they are found in most synthetic pictures."
With respect to this picture, it is stated at page 144
of volume 1 of Life in America, infra, that although it is
"false in almost every detail [it] has become the accepted
symbol of the event." According to plaintiffs, however, this
most famous of all American historical paintings, being
obviously a "fictional" work, must be suppressed, or else
henceforth in the State of Utah the exhibition or sale of
copies of it must be subject to the prior written consent
of the heirs of George Washington.
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Almost everyone is familiar with the numerous paintings portraying one of the saddest moments in American
history, Custer's Last Stand. Such pictures, it happens,
are all "fictional." Not one of them can be said to be either
authentic or factual. On this subject Life Magazine, in its
issue of June 21, 1948 had the following to say:
"Few battles before or since have inspired so
much controversy or so much bad art. Because the
only survivor of Custer's detachment was a wounded
horse * * * artists have let their imaginations
run wild. Nine samples of their work, good and
bad, are reproduced here. Custer is variously shown
fighting with one pistol, two pistols * * * afoot
and on horseback * * * The latest and artiest
painting * * * is the work of Thomas Benton
(next page), who said he did it because he got tired
of the saloon versions."

Under plaintiffs' contention, however, the sale of pictures
--- of Custer's. Last Stand is illegal in the State of Utah.
In a review (written by the distinguished American
critic, Bernard DeVoto) of the recently published twovolume history of the United States, in text and pictures,
entitled Life in America, by Marshall B._ Davidson (Houghton Mifflin Company, in association with the Metropolitan
Museum of Art, Boston, 1951), appearing in the Book Section of the New York Herald Tribune of Sunday, October
21, 1951, it is stated:
"It is striking that a picture may be factually
false but historically true nevertheless. Thus, a famous drawing from Champlain's 'Voyages' which
shows the explorer shooting Iroquois on behalf of
his Algonquin allies is absurd and erroneous in all
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its details, but it so truly presents the situation, the
conditions, and the implications of one of the most
decisive events of the Seventee;nth Century that to
see it is to understand them clearly and justly. The
idealizations, symbolisms,_ and sentimentalities of
popular belief become an immensely useful means of
historial interpretation. Caleb Bingham's 'Daniel
Boone' is a mythological picture, but it is at the very
heart of sentiments about the frontier whose importance in the westward movement could not be
overstated. Such· pictures repeatedly express the
emotion, the illusion, and the hope for, or the mirage
which produced human actions and which must be
felt if the actions are to be understood."
Would plaintiffs seriously contend that the exhibitio1;1
and sale of historical pictures which are "factuaily false,"
like the above pictures of Champlain and Daniel Boone, are
illegal in the State of Utah? Would plaintiffs seriously contend that the sale of the book Life in America is illegal in
Utah because it reproduces such pictures? Would plaintiffs seriously contend that it is illegal to distribute in the
State of Utah the issues of Life Magazine referred to
above because in them are reproduced fictional representations of famous deceased persons?
In light of the disastrous consequences of plaintiffs'
construction of the Utah statute is it possible to argue that
they have "ethical sanction?" That they are "defensible in
morals?" These questions are asked because the New York
Court of Appeals in holding the New York privacy statute
constitutional (Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193
N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, aff. 220 U. S. 502, 31 S. Ct. 490),
did so on the ground that the restraint thereby imposed

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59

···~
.·:::
'"'
. · ··'

~~~~

upon the use of names and portraits of living persons in the
form of advertisement or trade notices had "ethical sane..
tion," and that the abuse eliminated was "indefensible in
morals." The New York statute had a history. It was enacted to correct an existing wrong at the suggestion of the
highest court of the state, which was shocked by the discovery that the law afforded no protection against the use
of a person's picture to promote the sale of a brand of flour.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64
N. E. 442. And so in Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,
supra, the Court referred to the history of the statute and
explained the "ethical" and' "moral" sanctions which persuaded it to accept as reasonable the limitation imposed, in
the face of the constitutional objections advanced, stating:
"The power of the legislature in the absence of
any constitutional restriction to declare that a particular act shall constitute a crime or be actionable
as a tort cannot be questioned where the right established or recognized and sought to be protected is
based upon an ethical sanction. * * * There
was a natural and widespread feeling that such use
of * * * [names and portraits for advertising
purposes] in the absence of consent was indefensible
in morals and ought to be prevented by law. Hence
the enactment of this statute." (Italics supplied.)

But what history is there behind that part of the Utah
. ::: privacy statute which plaintiffs contend prevents the u'se
of the names and pictures of the famous dead in connection
· · · · with publications which clearly are a part of the free speech
and the press of the country? What existing wrong was that
. . . . part of the statute intended to correct? The defendants have
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been unable to find any such history, nor any such wrong.
On the contrary, that P~It of the Utah statute, if construed
.
·
'P1p~#;f"_Fs
1n the manner that 8s:ren-6tl:Ris here advocate, not only
would not correct any existing wrong, but would instead
create new wrongs, and as has been shown, would hobble
culture, shackle art and re~train creative expression. The
following language from Colyer v. Richard K. Fox Publishing Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N. Y. S. 999, 1001, with
reference to the New York statute is appropriate:
"When the statute was enacted originally in
1903, the custom of publishing in papers the portraits of individuals who were distinguished in their
activities of life was very general. If the legislature
had intended to wipe out this custom, it could have
said so easily in positive language. It did not so say
in terms, and the courts have proceeded to give the
statute full enforcement, within the meaning of its
express provisions, considered in the light of its history."
Similarly, if the Utah "legislature had intended to wipe
out this custom," i.~., the custom of creating and producing
works of the imagination in which deceased public figures
are portrayed fictionally, "it could have said so easily in
positive language. It did not say so in terms." It is submitted, therefore, that this Court should not give the Utah statute a construction which would wipe out this essential cus·
tom.
Briefly to summarize: Before the enactment of the
statute here involved, the citizens of Utah had the unques·
tioned right: (a) To deal with deceased public figures fat·
tually, and (b) to deal with deceased public figures fie·
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tionall·y. It is beyond dispute that any statute which presumed to take away right (a) would constitute an abridgement of the constitutional guarantees of free speech and ·
the press. So also, it is submitted, with respect to any
statute which imposed a restraint upon right (b), that
is, the right to deal fictionally with deceased public figures.
As herein demonstrated, the right to deal fictionally with
deceased public· figures is an ancient and basic part of our
cultural heritage. Without such right, our civilization and
our culture would be seriously impaired. Any interference
with that right is, therefore, an unreasonable as well as a
previous restraint on freedom of expression. Such a restraint
cannot be justified on the basis of any distinction between
a factual and a fictional portrayal of a deceased public
figure. The United States Supreme Court in the Burstyn,
Winters and Hannegan cases has made clear that works of
fiction and entertainment are protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and the press~ just as much
as works of a purely factual character. Consequently, under
the ruling of these cases, it would be as unreasonable to prohibit a publication dealing with a deceased public figure
fictionally as it would be to prohibit a publication dealing
with a deceased public figure factually. Furthermore, the ·
mere fact that a motion picture is involved cannot justify
the restraint. Burstyn v. Wilson, supra.

It is evident that if the plaintiffs' construction of the
- - - Utah statute were accepted, an unreasonable and previous
· · - restraint of the freedom of speech and the press would be
effected. The question· then presents itself as to how the
statute should be construed to avoid this result. The obvious
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answer is to give it the common sense construction of holding it inappl~cable to motion pictures or other media of
communication within the ambit of free speech and the
press. By its own language, the statute applies only to uses
"for ~dvertising purposes or for pu,rposes of trade." For
reasons hereinafter set forth, _it clearly was not the legisla.
tive intent to include subjects of free speech and press
within the ban applicable to advertising or trade materials.
As stated, the implications of the Burstyn case finally
were adopted by the trial court in its rulings on the defenddants' counterclaims for declaratory relief. In paragraphs
2 and 3 of the declaratory judgment, the trial court held
that in view of the provisions of the state and federal constitutions, Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the ·Utah Code
Anno. (1943) were not applicable to the distribution or
exhibition of motion picture films containing factual or
fictional portrayals of a deceased public figure such as
Jack Donahue (R. 119-180) . An affirmance of this ruling
would make unnecessary the consideratio~ of any of the
other questions raised on this appeal.
POINT II
THE STATUTORY PROHIBITION AGAINST
USES "FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES OR
FOR PURPOSES OF T'RADE" DOES NOT APPLY TO THE EXHIBITION OF MOTION PICTURES.
Sections 103-4-8 and 103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno.
( 1943) require the prior written permission of the heirs
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in order to use the name, portrait or picture of a deceased
::person, only if the use is "for advertising purposes or for
·,purposes of trade." As heretofore suggested, if the statute
-' were held to be inapplicable to the distribution and exhibi' tion of motion pictures or other media of free speech and
~: the press, the constitutional problem with respect to the
~ statute's construction resolves itself. In addition, as here: in demonstrated, such a construction of the statute would
,: be in accordance with both legislative intent and judicial
. authority as well as the evidentiary facts of the present
case.

The Utah statute was enacted in 1909. Except in re2 spect of its treatment of deceased persons, it is substantial·~ ly identical to the New York statute passed in 1903 (Laws
~~ of 1903, Chap. 132). The New York law was enacted
:.:primarily in response to a suggestion contained in an opin~: ion handed down the previous year by the New York Court
~ of Appeals in Roberson v. Roc~ester Folding Bo~ Co., 171
~ N. Y. 538, ~4 N. E. 442. In that case, a milling company
had appropriated without permission the photograph of the
plaintiff, a pretty young woman, and had used it to advertise a brand of flour. The advertisement, which was
widely distributed, consisted of a photograph of the plainI tiff above the caption "Flour of the Family" together with
other representations concerning the milling_ company and
~ its product. The Court of Appeals held that in the absence
: of a statute, the plaintiff was without remedy and it suggested appropriate legislation. In response, Sections 50 and
51 of the New York Civil Rights Code was enacted by the
next session of the Legislature. In Rhodes v. Sperry &
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Hutchinson Co., 193 N. Y. 223, 85 N. E. 1097, aff. 220 U.
S. 502, the Court of Appeals of New York traced the history of the enactment, the motives which prompted it, and
the nature of the right granted, stating:

"* * * Such is the character of the right
of privacy preserved by legislation protecting persons against the unauthorized use of their name or
portraits in the form of advertisement or trade wtices. It is a recognition by the lawmaking power
of the very general sentiment which prevailed
throughout the community against permitting advertisers to promote the sale of their wares by this
method, regardless of the wishes of the persons
thereby affected." [Italics supplied.]
The New York statute employs the same phraseology
"for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade" asappears in the Utah statute. The particular type of wrong
which the New York Legislature intended to correct is evident. It intended to prohibit the use of personalized advertising material of the type involved in the Roberson
case, without the written consent of the person involved.
So far as the New York Legislature was concerned "for
advertising purposes or for purposes of trade" meant using
the picture of a pretty girl to advertise a brand of flour.
·When the Utah Legislature passed substantially the same
statute in 1909 and used the same terminology, it is reasonable to assume that it intended to prohibit the same kind of
advertising and trade materials, and to remedy the same
type of wrong. Obviously the term "trade" was used in the
sense that denotes barter, purchase, or sale of goods, wares
or merchandise, and refers to the unauthorized use of an
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; attribute of personality such as a name, picture or portrait
-~--to promote the sale of a collateral commodity.
'

•,'

In 1903 and 1909, motion pictures as they are known
today did not exist. The first talking picture was not pro:: duced until 1926. "Motion Pictures and The First Amend_> ment" 60 Yale L. J. 696. The concept of motion pictures
- as a media of communication did not emerge until many
~ years later. See footnote 10 of Burstyn v. Wilson, supra. It
-. is unlikely that either the New York or the Utah Legisla~ tures gave any consideration to the problem of whether
: motion pictures constituted "advertising or trade." Undoubtedly the Legislatures did consider and did intend to
exclude from the ban of the statute, subjects which at that
~ time were traditionally recognized as part of the free
.. speech and press of the country. Otherwise, why should the
Legislatures have confined themselves to the narrow termin-- ology of "advertising purposes or for purposes of trade."
·-- If more than the type of situation involved in the Roberson
case had been intended, surely language of a more inclusive
· character would have been employed. As aptly stated on
_ page 40 of plaintiffs' brief, ·"it should clearly appear from
~ the enactment itself that an activity was covered by clear
and decisive words or the court should not bring it in by
- judicial construction of doubtful words."
The decisions of this Court in cases involving similar
statutes in which the term "trade" appears, likewise support the view that motion picture exhibitions are not included within the commonly accepted definition of that
term. Paramor Theatre Co. v. Trade Commission, 95 Utah
854, 81 P. (2d) 639; Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah
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51, 16 P. (2d) 900. In the Paramor Theatre case, the
question presented was "whether the operation of moving
picture theatres and exhibition of films" constitute "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the statute defining
the jurisdiction of the Utab Trade Commission. After a consideration of many authorities, this Court concluded that
theatrical exhibitions, although carried on for money,
should not be classified as "trade or commerce" in the commonly accepted meaning of those words. The Court ·said
that if it. had been the intention to give the words a different or broader meaning, "the legi"slative enactment
should by clear and decisive words indicate the intent so to
do," rather than to leave the matter "to depend on a judicial
construction of doubtful words." So too, in Beard v. Board
of Education, sup·ra, this Court held that the exhibition of
motion pictures and theatrical performances as part of the
extra-curricular activity of the schools was not "trade or
commerce" within the intent of a statute providing that
school buildings could not be used for "commercial purposes."
The definition of "trade" contained in the Paramor
Theatre case is in accord with the undisputed evidence adduced during the trial of the case at bar. Professor Eaton,
a distinguished drama critic and teacher of playwriting,
testified that the creation and exhibition of a play or
motion picture is not regarded as a matter of "trade" by
authors, critics or anyone else familiar with the drama (R.
485). The object of trade, according to Professor Eaton,
is something like Campbell's soup which is produced over
and over again (R. 489), as distinguished from the production and exhibition of a play or a motion picture which
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represents a unique artistic accomplishment ( R. 487) . As
illustrative of this distinction, reference was made to the
product known as Prince Albert Tobacco. A picture of
Prince Albert in his whiskers and long frock coat is stamped
on each can (R. 488). Such use of a historical character
in promotion of the sale of a. product is clearly for pur. · · ·poses of trade and advertising. In contrast, the play "Victoria Regina" depicted Prince Albert with the same whiskers and frock coat. It is certain that the creators and producers of "Victoria Regina" did not regard themselves as
engaging in "trade" (R. 489) . In the scrapbooks, Exhibits
1 to 8, produced by Mrs. Donahue at the trial, there appear
numerous advertisements of the beverage "Moxie" also of
Bulova watches and similar products, in which the name
and picture of Jack Donahue were used along with other
advertising material (Exhibit 2). Although the record is
silent as to whether Jack Donahue's permission was ob. . . tained in connection with these purely commercial broadsides, they clearly represent a use of his name and picture
"for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade." On
the other hand; Jack Donahue was bot:h. an author and the
star of the musical show "Sons O'Guns" (R. 222). It is
unlikely that he considered either his play or his performance therein as a matter of "trade."
As stated, the legislative history, the rules of statutory
construction and judicial precedents, as well as the evidence adduced at the trial, all point to the conclusion that
motion pictures, plays, no:vels and similar achievements of
creative art are not "advertising or trade" within the intent or meaning of those words as used in the Utah statute.
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When the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, considered this case, it defined "advertising or trade"
as including the distribution or exhibition of a motion picture "based primarily upon fiction or the imagination and
designed primarily to entertain and amuse an audience desiring entertainment and willing to pay therefor" (194 F.
(2d) 12). Again, as it did in connection with the issue
of whether "Look for the Silver Lining" was essentially
educational or informative or purely biographical, the Tenth
Circuit said that on the basis of the allegations of the
amended complaint it could not say as a matter of law
whether the motion picture constituted "trade" within its
own particular definition of that term. The effect of this ruling was to leave the· issue to be determined as one of fact.
And so, at the trial in the state court, the trial judge told
the jury in its Instructions No. 3 and No. 6, that if the
motion picture was "based essentially upon fiction or the
imaginative and designed primarily to entertain and amuse
an audience desiring entertainment, then your verdict
should be for the plaintiffs and you should proceed to
assess the damages * * *" (R. 156, 549; 159, 551).
No exceptions to these instructions were taken by th~ plaintiffs (R. 560) . In the light of the verdict, it must be presumed that the jury found as a fact that the distribution
and exhibition of the motion picture was not "trade" as
thus defined.
Only at the conclusion of the case when considering the
defendants' counterclaims for declaratory relief, did the
trial court hold as a matter of law in paragraph 4 of the
declaratory judgment that the distribution and exhibition
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~ of motion picture films did not constitute a use "for ad~· vertising purposes or for purposes of trade" within the in~ tent of the statute (R. 180) . As with the constitutional
~ issue, if this Court should affirm paragraph 4 of the de~

claratory judgment, this appeal would be disposed of without the necessity of considering the re~aining questions.

POINT III
THE ERRATIC AND DECADENT FORMUL,A
DEVISED BY THE NEW YORK -COURTS IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE.
Reference has been made to the New York statute,
which apparently was the model for the Utah statute.
Under the circumstances of the similarity of the laws of
the two states, and because the majority opinion of the
Tenth Circuit places some reliance upon the New York
decisions in construing the Utah statute, a brief discussion
of the New York cases may be of some assistance in the
present situation.

At the outset, it should be reiterated that-· the New
York statute deals only with living persons and their rights .
. The New York courts have never had to face the problem
of a right of privacy action involving a deceased public
figure and the relational rights of his heirs. This distinction must be kept in mind in considering the New York
decisions and their application to the case at bar. As her-etofore indicated, there are profound reasons based upon cultural necessity for according preferential status to publications concerning the famous dead, as distinguished from
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the living. Since the New York decisions deal only with
the living, they have little persuasiveness when applied to
situations involving the famous dead.
The New York statute had been on the books only a
short time before the courts of that state were faced with
the necessity of construing it so as not to interfere with
time-honored concepts of free speech and press as typified
by biographies and newspaper accounts dealing with famous
living persons. The New York courts attempted to meet the
problem by devising a formula, which, although substantially modified and perhaps destroyed by more recent decisions,
nevertheless persists to some extent. The formula is this:
In the case of a publication concerning a famous living per•
son, if it is an accurate account of a current news event or
is purely biographical or is an absolutely true portrayal or
is essentially educational or informative, then it is not a
matter of "trade" within the meaning of the New York
statute; on the other hand,· if the publication is fictionalized
or the portrayal is not true or is largely a product of the
imagination or is not purely biographical or is not strictly
educational or informative, then it is a matter of "trade"
proscribed by the statute. As is apparent, the formula was
devised not only to take care of the defin~tion of the term
"trade" in the statute, but also to meet possible constitutional objections based on free speech and the press. Essentially the same formula was adopted by the majority of
the Tenth Circuit in interpreting the Utah statute when
the present case was pending before it (194 F. (2d) 6).
One of the first New York cases to apply the above
formula was Binns v. Vitagraph, 210 N. Y. 51, 103 N. E.
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:- 1108. In that case a series of motion pictures were produced
,~ and exhibited purporting to portray Jack Binns, a wireless
operator, and the hero of a ship collision at sea. Binns
.- claimed that the pictures improperly portrayed him and the
:_. -heroic event of which he was a part, without his consent.
~ He sought relief under the New York statute for an in~, junction and damages. The New York Court of Appeals,
. after holding that the "use of the name, portrait, or picture
~- of a living person in truthfully recounting or portraying an
.~ actual current event" would not be within the prohibition
of the statute, said that in the case before it "the series of
-pictures were not true pictures of a current event, but
_ mainly a product of the imagination, based, however,
largely upon such information relating to an actual oc:
..
currence as could readily be obtained.'' The Court then held
that since the motion pictures involved were neither news
nor biography, they were within the prohibition of the statute. Substantially, the same formula was repeated and ap- plied with minor variations in Humiston v. Universal Film
- Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N. Y. S. 752; Blumenthal
·~ v. Picture Classics, 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N. Y. S. 800;
and Krieger v. Popular Publications, 167 Misc. 5, 3 N. Y. S.
~ (2d) 480.
r'!'

,.

In recent years, however, the New York courts have
stretched and modified their previously announced formula
to take from under the ban of the statute, certain publications which otherwise would have been interdicted. For
example, in. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne and Heath, Inc.,
188 Misc. 479, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 779, aff. 272 App. Div.
759, 69 N. Y..s. (2d) 432, the New York Supreme Court
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held that a book therein involved was a biography of a
famous living person and therefore not prohibited by the
New York statute, even though the Court recognized that
it was in part apocryphal, without factual basis, and in some
respects not only untrue but defamatory. In its discussion,
the Court said :
"The book we are considering deals almost entirely with the plaintiff's musical career. Very little
is said about his private life. Inde-ed, the author
suggests that Dr. Koussevitzky had room for nothing in his life but music and a devotion to his loyal
wife and helpmate. Interspersed with the chronological narration of the facts are stories and comments in connection with the plaintiff's musical career, some avowedly- apocryphal, others of doubtful
reliability. Curiously enough, although there are
many depreciatory statements, they seem to be invariably followed by ameliorative observations of
unrese-rved praise. * *- * Most people know that
a great conductor's work with his orchestra is not
altogether carried on in an atmosphere of sweetness
and light. The author evidently knows that too and
loses no opportunity to inform his readers about it.
In his final chapter, the author gives his personal
estimate of the plaintiff's place in musical history
and in sentence after sentence we find that depreciation and praise vie with each other for utterance.
"There are statements in the ,book which the
plaintiff might naturally find to be highly objectionable, if he is at all sensitive about those things.
He may be able to prove some of them to be untrue
and even defamatory. There are however, no so·
called revelations of any intimate details which
would tend to outrage public tolerance. There is
nothing repugnant to one's sense of decency or thnt
takes the book out of the realm of the legitimate
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dissemination of information on a subject of general interest."
~

-.
Still another expression of unhappiness with the Binns'
: formula is Malo~y v. Bo-y Comics Publishers, Inc., 277 Div.
' 166, 98 N. Y. S. (2d) 119. In that case, the plaintiff, a
public hero who had assisted in the rescue of injured per~ sons when a bomber plane crashed into the Empire State
_, Building in 1945, brought suit under the New York statute,
for publication without his consent of an article together
with comic strip cartoons concerning him in a magazine
-. entitled Boy Comics. The magazine, published some six
, months after the actual event had occurred, contained a
series of symbolic cartoons dramatically portraying the
_ plaintiff and his rescue of injured persons. There were a
number of errors and inaccuracies in the account, also exaggerations and flights of fancy consistent with the char- acter of the publication. The plaintiff placed strong re-= liance upon the doctrine of Binns. The New York Supreme
Court held that even though the account and comic strips
were sold for profit and were neither educational nor newsworthy, the publication was a matter of legitimate public
or general interest concerning a public figure who had been
.~ much in the public eye, and that such a publication was not
;: "trade" within the intent of the New York statute. The
Binns case was disposed of with the comment that "since
~· its decision in 1913, it has been distinguished frequently
and confined to its particular facts."

..

The Koussevitzky and Malony cases indicate the
crumbling condition of the formula devised by the New
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York courts in the application of its statute to publications
involving living public figures. A recent case comment in
51 Michigan L. Rev. 764, concerning the opinion of the
Tenth Circuit in the instant case, sums up the defects of
the New York doctrine and its adoption by the majority
of the Tenth Circuit, as follows:

"* * * In determining what matters are
permissible because of their informational value, the
New York course of decision has indeed been erratic.
At times, the courts have resorted to a distinction
between a factual treatment of events involving the
public figu;re, which is permissible, and a fictional
treatment, which is not, but this distinction has not
been the · real fulcrum of decision in this area, for
·it is often ignored and seldom rigidly applied. Be..
hind, and at the source of, the confusion in the New
York cases seems to be a shifting of judicial attitude as to the scope of the statute. In what seems
to be the better reasoned cases, the courts have proceeded beyond the finding that the defendant-publisher had a commercial motivation to a consideration of the material itself, demonstrating considerable reluctance to apply the statute so long as some
informational value could. be found; in other cases
the courts tend to ignore the possible value of the
publication itself and probe the motivation· of the
publisher in an effort to determine whether the
publication is 'for purpose of trade' and thus, ipso
facto, prohibited. The majority opinion in the principal case [i. e. the Donahue case in the Tenth Circuit] seems to illustrate the defects in this latter approach. The defendant's motives in making the film
afford no index to its possible informational value,
which would seem to be the real question at issue.
Nor can the value of the film be properly assessed by
mechanical application of the factual-fictional dis-
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tinction, as the New York experience with the distinction well proves. Indeed, the court's use of this
distinction, as the dissent in the principal case pointed
out, makes it questionable whether historical novels
or most historical films may be distributed in Utah
without liability under the statute, and demonstrates
a marked lack of regard for the freedom of speech
and press guaranteed by the United States constitution. It is doubtful that this decision will survive
with unimpaired vigor."

As a practical matter, no one has suggested that the
ormula of the Binns case should be extended to many day
:> day fictional portrayals in the State of New York of
amous living persons. For example, there are being pub.shed daily in the New York newspapers, political and
ports cartoons, in which the pictures and names of public
igures are used in clearly fictional situations. A few days
efore a recent prize fight, a New York newspaper carried
cartoon in which Rocky Marciano, the well-known prize
ighter, was shown climbing a ladder (symbolic of success)
1 an imaginary scene. Another newspaper carried a car)On in which Winston Churchill, portrayed as "Androcles"
; shown removing a thorn from the paw of the British lion.
•hese cartoons represent living people in situations which
re "fictional." Yet no one has presumed to suggest that
~e New York statute prohibits such portrayals or that
distinction should be made between the factual and the
ictional use of a person's name and picture as applied to
llch situations. The limitations of the Binns formula is
ot confined to the field of cartoons. There are produced
rom time to time on the New York stage, plays and
~
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sketches in which famous living persons are portrayed in
fictional situations. One such example is "As Thousands
Cheer" ( 1933), a famous musical review (music by Irving
Berlin, book by Moss Hart) in which a number of then
living public figures were impersonated ·under their own
I
names including Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Hoover, Will H.
Hayes, John D. Rockefeller, Sr. and Jr. Another example
is the famous play "I'd Rather Be Right" ( 1938), written
by. George s~ Kaufman and Moss Hart, lyrics by Lorenz
Hart, and the music by Richard Rodgers. In this play, the
then living actor, George M. Cohan, impersonated the then
President of the .United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
under the President's own name. The cast of characters
who were impersonated in the play included members of
Roosevelt's cabinet and of his family, and a great many
then living famous personalities. The play was satirical
and its situations wholly fictional. Still another example,
the Viking Press has published in New York, over a period
of eleven years, a series of sequelized novels by Upton Sinclair. In these novels the author gives his version of this
.critical period in world history ~Y creating a. fictional character, Lanny Budd, and placing him in imaginary situations
carrying on imaginary conversations with many living pub·
lie figures around whom the actual events of that period
revolve. Again, Collier's magazine of October 22, 1951,
was devoted in its entirety to a wholly imaginary account
of the Third World War under the title "Preview of the
War We Do Not Want." The account described "Russia's
defeat and occupation 1952-1960." In this imaginary ac·
count many famous living people were depicted or men·
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ttioned in fictional situations, including Eisenhower, Tito
~and

Cyrus Sulzberger.

The foregoing illustrations suggest some of the prac~ tical limitations to which the decadent formula of Binns,
~as exposed in the New York cases, is necessarily sub. ject. As indicated,. the formula is having difficulty surviv::ing even under the present status of the New York author~ ·ities. One cannot help but wonder what its fate would be
~in the face of a challenge based upon the principles enun~-ciated in Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 68 S. Ct. 665
::and Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777. In
1 ~any event, the New York formula applies only to the Living.
-The case now before this Court deals with the Dead. As
=heretofore pointed out, both on the basis of ..constitutional
~:authority and cultural custom, so far as famous deceased
:~public figures are concerned, there is no necessity for att~tempting to reconcile the dying doctrine of Binns with the
·;:more recent pronouncements of the New York courts and
~~of the United States Supreme Court.
POINT IV
THE UTAH STATUTE IS A CODIFICATION
OF A LIMITED RIGHT OF PRIVACY-PERSONAL IN NATURE.

:;,

The plaintiffs make the claim that Sections 103-4-8
1; and 103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. (1943) are not merely
~:a codification of the common law right of privacy, but
;~·something more which includes a property interest. There~:;fore, say the plaintiffs, the trial court erred in failing (R.
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10) to permit them to further amend their amended complaint by adding allegations pertaining to the value of Jack
Donahue's name as a property right in the nature of a
monetary asset (R. 67). Similar type "property" allega.
tions were contained in paragraph 9 of the amended complaint, concerning a claim that the· exhibition of "Look for
the Silver Lining" had prevented Mrs. Donahue from selling
a manuscript based upon the career of Jack Donahue. But
these allegations were stricken from the complaint by the
lower federal court and that action was approved by the
Tenth Circuit, on the grounds of irrelevancy and immateriality. Furthermore, this ruling of the federal court was
accepted by the plaintiffs by stipulation in the state court
(R. 64). In any event, the plaintiffs' attempt to further
amend their amended ·complaint, after the case was at issue
and had .been pending in the federal and state courts for
nearly three· years, clearly was a matter for the exercise of
the trial court's discretion, and its ruling thereon is not
open to review on this appeal.
So far as points I, II, and III of defendants' brief are
concerned, it is immaterial whether the Utah statute is
deemed to be something more or less than the common law
right of privacy. However, since the plaintiffs have raised
the question and since the personal nature of the right con·
ferred by the Utah. statute is pertinent to the conflict of
laws argument hereinafte·r set forth, the views of the defendants on this aspect of the case are herewith presented.
As previously stated, the Utah statute undoubtedly was
derived from the New York statute. No one has ever con·
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_~
_ tended that the New York statute confers or was intended
_~~to confer any right except a limited personal right based
.'·upon but narrower than, the common law right of privacy.
~
'
__ As stated in Koussevitzky v. All.en, To zone & Heath, Inc.,
-~ 188 Misc. 479, 68 N. Y. S. (2d) 779, 781: The New York
··statute "sought to protect the sentiments, thoughts and
~~feelings of an individual by embodying 'a legal recognition
·--limited in scope to be sure, but a clearly expressed recog-- nition nevertheless-of the right of a person to be let alone,
··a right directed "against the commercial exploitation of
· , one's personality".' " It is significant also that both the
:. majority and minority opinions of the Tenth Circuit treat
~:the Utah statute, like the New York statute, as merely
~- a legislative recognition of the personal right of privacy.
'

It was not until the publication in 1890 of the article
_by Warren and Brandeis in 4 Harvard L. Rev. 193 that a
. .-right of privacy was clearly formulated. The article "enj_oys the unique distinction of having initiated and theoretically outlined a new field of jurisprudence'' (12 Colum:·bia L. Rev. 693). The authors of the article make clear
~that even though many of the early cases were technically
:based upon supposed relationships of. implied contract or
:trust, the true "principle which has been applied to protect
~these rights is in reality not the principle of private prop:erty, unless that word be used in an extended and unusual
sense." The· article further defines the right of privacy
as a distinct and independent right and states that when
the right is invaded "a legal remedy for such injury seems
to involve the treatment of mere wounded feelings, as a
substantive cause of action" ( 4 Harvard L. Rev. 197).
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Since the Warren and Brandeis article, all of the better
reasoned authorities have recognized the right of privacy
. as an independent right, personal in nature, and distinct
from any principle of property. Recovery for an invasion
of the right of privacy is limited to injury to the feelings
and sensibilities of the complainant. In the language of
Prosser on Torts, Section 107, p. 1053: "[T]he right of
privacy has been recognized from the beginning as primarily concerned with the protection of a mental interest. It
seems obvious that it is only a phase of the larger problem
of the protection of plaintiff's peace of mind against unreasonable disturbance." See also Reed v. Real Detective
Pub. 9o., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P. (2d) 133, 138; Metter v. Los
Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491,
494; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91; Pound,
"Interests of Personality", 28 Harvard L. Rev. 343, 363.
Thre·e states, namely, New York, Utah and Virginia,
have adopted limited right of privacy statutes. There are
no reported decisions construing the Virginia statute. There
are a number of decisions interpreting the New York law.
The close similarity in wording of the two acts suggests,
of course, that the New York statute was used as a model
by the t,Jtah legislature. Two New York decisions, Schuyler
v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 and Wyatt v. Hall's
Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. S. 247, the first
decided prior to the New York statute and the second after
its enactment, both illustrate the· view that the right of
privacy is purely a personal right for which damages may
be recovered only for injury sustained to a person's feel-
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ings and sensibilities by reason of the unlawful use of a
name, portrait or picture.
The Schuyler case was an action brought by a nephew
of Mrs. George L. Schuyler, deceased, on behalf of himself
and the immediate surviving relatives of the deceased, to
enjoin the defendants from exhibiting a statue of Mrs.
Schuyler, a noted New York philanthropist and a granddaughter of Alexander Hamilton. The exhibition of the
statue was without the consent of the plaintiff or of any
of the deceased's surviving relatives. Although the action
was brought a couple of years before enactment of the
New York privacy statute, the Court of Appeals assumed
the existence of such a right for the purposes of the case.
The Court after weighing the facts of the case decided
that there were no grounds for a claim of mental distress on
the part of the plaintiff or of the other relatives of the
deceased. In the course of its opinion, the Court discussed
at some length the nature of the particular right asserted,
holding it to be a purely personal one, which so far as the
surviving relatives were concerned, existed only for the
protection of their own personal feelings. The Court stated:

"* * * Whatever the rights of a relative
may b,e they are not, in such case as this, rights
which once belonged to the deceased, and which a
relative can enforce in her behalf and in a mere representative capacity; as, for instance, an executor
or administrator, in regard to the assets of a deceased. It is not a question of what right of privacy
Mrs. Schuyler had in her lifetime. The plaintiff
does not represent that right. Whatever right of
privacy Mrs. Schuyler had died with her. Death deprives us all of rights, in the legal sense of that
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term; and, when Mrs. Schuyler died, her own individual right of privacy, whatever it may have
been, expired at the same time. The right which '
survived (however extensive or limited) was a right
pertaining to the living only. It is the right of privacy of the living which it is sought to enforce here.
That right may in some cases be itself violated by
improperly interfering with the character or memory of a deceased relative, but it is the right of the
living, and not that of the dead, which is recognized.
A privilege may be given the surviving relatives of
a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings, and to prevent a violation of their
own rights in the character and memory of the deceased. * * *"

Wyatt v. Hall's Portrait Studio, supra, arose on a motion for an order to permit the administratrix of the goods,
chattels, and credits of Helen Wyatt, deceased, to revive an
action which originally had been brought by Helen Wyatt,
herself, against the named defendant. The original action
had been brought under the New York right of privacy
statute, for an injunction and damages for the unauthorized
use of Helen Wyatt's name and picture. The question presented was whether the alleged cause of action survived
the death of the original plaintiff. The Court (Justice Seabury) said that if the alle-ged violation of the rights of
Helen Wyatt constituted an injury to her person, then the
action would abate. But on the other hand, if the alleged
violation constituted an injury to some property right, then
it would survive her death and the action could be continued in the name of the administratrix. Therefore, said
the Court, it was necessary to determine the nature and
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~~·character of the "right" referred to by the New York stat-

..._

~: ute. It thereupon held that the right created was in its

~very nature personal; the injury inflicted by violation of the
::: right did not affect the estate of the person injured, but
·:. was strictly an injury to the person of the plaintiff. The
-:,--·court cited with approval Schuyler v. Curtis, supra, and
~ concluded that the case before it did not present the ques~··~ tion of the independent right of the administratrix to main~- tain an action based on injury to her feelings resulting from
~-. improper interference with the name and memory of the
; deceased. If such an action could be maintained, the Court
j' said it would necessarily be by virtue of an independent
right in the administratrix, and not by virtue of any right
derived from the deceased. In the course of its opinion, the
__ Court said:

~

"The cause of action arose from the violation
of the right of privacy. It was solely the creation of
statute, and had no existence independent of the
statute (citations). It is evident from the statute
that the violation of the right thereby created was
intended by the Legislature to be punishable as a
crime and actionable as a tort (citation). The right
of privacy, or, as it has sometimes been called, the
'right to be let alone,' is in its nature personal. The
peculiarly personal character of the cause of action
created by the statute, negatives the idea that the
Legislature intended that it should be enforceable by
the personal representatives of the person in whose
favor the cause of action existed. The injury done
by the violation of the right does not affect the estate of the person injured, but is strictly an injury
to the person of the plaintiff. * * *

*

*

*

*

*
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"Nor is there room in this case for the contention that the present action should be revived in
order to prevent the defendant from improperly interfering with the character or memory of the plaintiff. If such an action could be maintained, it would
necessarily be by virtue of an independent right to
maintain it, and not by virtue of any right derived
from the deceased. The complaint alleges a cause
of action in the plaintiff for an injury to her person
which did not survive her death, and the motion by
her administratrix to revive the action must be denied."
The above cases clearly demonstrate that the New York
courts consistently have interpreted the limited statutory , ,
right of privacy of that state as exclusive from and unrelated to any principle of property. See Note, 28 Harvard L.
Rev. 689, 691. So far as the Utah statute is concerned, it
is evident that the right conferred likewise is a limited one
based upon injury to the feelings of the "heirs" themselves,
separate from any right of privacy which the deceased
relative, himself, might have had during his own lifetime.
The "heirs' " cause of action for an alleged violation of their
right of privacy in the name of their deceased relative is a
purely personal right, not a property right. Their damage,
if any, would consist of "injuries sustained" to their feelings by reason of the alleged unlawful use of their relative's name in Utah. The plaintiffs in the present case obviously adopt~d this view of the Utah statute at the time
of drafting both their original and their amended complaint,
since they alleged a cause of action based only upon "injuries sustained" to their feelings by reason of the portrayal
of the deceased Jack Donahue without their consent. No

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

85
damage of any kind was requested by reason of any invasion of a property interest. The amended complaint
speaks only of the "vexed and annoyed and humiliated"
sensibilities of the plaintiffs.
There is nothing in any of the several cases cited by
the plaintiffs which in any way reflects upon the expressed
view as to the personal nature of the right of privacy.
Hinish v. M~ier & Frank Comp,any, Inc., 166 Or. 482, 113
P. (2d) 438; Pavesick v. New England Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, and Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla.
198, 20 So. (2d) 243, all are cases which recognize the
right of privacy as a new and independent right and historically trace the development of the privacy concept from
the early cases involving property and contract rights.
Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136,
67 A. 392, Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195
S. E. 55, and Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134
S. W. 1076 are examples of the reasoning of some of the
earlier cases in which the courts persist in considering the
problem as pegged to an extent at least on property and
contract rights, and indicate a reluctance to recognize that
in reality a new interest of personality is involved. The
reasoning found in cases of this type is not. in accord with
what is now clearly the majority view, and .overlooks entirely the profound consideration given the personal nature
of the right by such outstanding authorities as Warren,
Brandeis and Pound.
POINT V
THE UTAH CONFLICT OF LAWS RULE
REQUIRES
PLAINTIFFS'
SUBSTANTIVE
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RIGHTS TO BE DETERMINED BY THE LAW
OF CALIFORNIA.
The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged a single
tort for injury resulting from the allegedly unlawful use
of the name of Jack Donahue by exhibition of "Look for
the Silver Lining" in various "theatres and on numerous
occasions throughout the State of Utah and throughout the
United States" (R. 50). The amended complaint did not
seek damages for each separate exhibition of the motion
picture or for exhibitions that occurred in each separate
state. By the terms of their pleading, the plaintiffs sought
recovery in a single cause of action for all damages caused
by all exhibitions in all theatres where the motion picture
had been shown· "throughout the United States." The tort
alleged was a multi-state one, with incidents in different
states wherever "Look for the Silver Lining" had been
exhibited and wherever the plaintiffs had sustained injury
to their feelings as a result thereof. These allegations were
supported by the plaintiffs' testimony at the trial. Mrs.
Donahue and her daughters testified that they were residents of Los Angeles, California, and had lived there since
1936. Until the time of trial, they had never been in Utah
except to stay over-night enroute to their summer hon1e
in Cape Cod (R. 214; 253-254). Plaintiffs saw the motion
picture at a preview in Beverly Hills on March 15, 1949
(R . 244; 251). They saw the picture only on that one occasion (R. 255) and at the suggestion of one of their attorneys (R. 252). They were upset, humiliated and dis~ tressed by the picture (R. 235; 255). So far as the hurt
to their feelings was concerned, they had never picked out
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any particular state in which to measure their hurt (R.
250). They didn't think they could limit their hurt to the
boundaries of any particular state (R. 262). The full
amount of damages prayed for in the amended complaint
was based upon the hurt they felt as a result of the exhibition of the motion picture throughout the United States
and the world (R. 262; 265-266). The prayer for damages
referred to all exhibitions including the exhibition at the
Beverly Hills Theatre which plaintiffs witnessed. It was
upon seeing the motion picture in California that the
plaintiffs felt the most acute shock to their feelings ( R.
26-65).
The first question which a court is required to consider,
when confronted with a case sounding in tort such as the
present one, is: What law should govern the substantive
rights of the parties? In the case of a multi-state tort such
as the one at bar, a choice of. applicable law must be made.
What then is the Utah conflict of laws rule under
these circumstances? Sartin v. Oregon Short Line R. Co.,
27 Utah 447, 76 P. 219, Johnson v. Union Pacific Coal Co.,
28 Utah 46, 76 P. 1089, and Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah
267, 176 P. (2d) 118, 168 A. L. R. 177, make crystal clear
that the Utah conflict of laws rule is that the law of the
place of wrong governs the right of recovery for injuries
to the person. In fact, Buhler v. Maddison, supra, goes so
far as to say that procedural matters intimately connected
with the substantive right of action likewise must be governed by the law of the place of wrong~ The cited Utah
cases, as well as general tort law, hold that the place of
wrong is the place where the injury takes effect upon the
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person. Restatement, Conflict. of Laws, Section 377; State
v. Devot, 66 Utah 319, 242 P. 395; see also Stoltz v. Burlington Transportation Co., (C. C. A. 10), 178 F. (2d) 514,
15 A. L. R. (2d) 759. In the Devot case, this Court stated
that if a person in Utah fraudulently should obtain money
from a person in California, the case should be determined
in California "where the injury was done and the consequences of the wrong inflicted."
Under the compulsion of the Utah conflict of laws rule,
the next query is where did the impact of injury take place
with respect to the damages alleged by the plaintiffs in
the present case? Obviously, any "mental and physical
suffering" sustained by the plaintiffs took effect in the
state in which the plaintiffs were physically located at the
time of the alleged unlawful exhibitions of the motion picture. If the plaintiffs were physically present in California
at all times during which the exhibitions occurred in Colorado or Utah or Delaware or New York, the impact of
injury on their feelings and sensibilities took place in California rather than in the respective states where the exhibitions took place. It is undisputed that the plaintiffs
at all times alleged and referred to in their amended complaint were citizens and residents of California. Necessarily
their mental and physical suffering, if any, resulting from
the acts complained of, took effect and made impact upon
the bodies and minds of the plaintiffs in California. It
must follow, therefore, that California law governs the
plaintiffs' right to recover for the tort here alleged. Under
the substantive law of California even the plaintiffs agree
that they cannot maintain an action of the kind here al-
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leged. ]}Jetter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d)
304, 95 P. (2d) 491.

The majority opinion of the Tenth Circuit on this
phase of the case states that "the initial sneak preview of
the picture in California and the appellants seeing it there
did not as a matter of law bar recovery under the statute
· ' of Utah. * * *" It is true that a lower federal court
in Banks v. King Features Syndicate, (D. C., S. D., N. Y.),
30 F. Supp. 352 has held that the law of the state where
the seal of privacy was first broken constitutes the controlling law. This is one of several possible conflict of laws
rules suggested by an article in 60 Harvard Law Rev. 941.
But each state is free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws
as it may choose. Wells V. Simonds Abrasive Co., 344 U. S.
· · · 815, 73 S. Ct. 856. And the defendants' contention throughout this case has been that the orthodox conflict of laws
rule of Utah should be applied, that is, that the cause of
action should be governed by the law of the state where
the injury occurred. This is the conventional conf~ict of
laws rule which has been established in this state. Under
the Utah rule that the lex loci delicti governs, it is immaterial where the seal of privacy was first broken or where
or when the various exhibitions of the motion picture took
place. In either instance, the complainants' right of action
would be governed by the la'v of the state where they sustained injury to their feelings and .sensibilities, that is,
the state where they were physically located. Since the
only damage that is or can be claimed by the plaintiffs in
this case is for injury to their feelings and sensibilities, it
is a self-demonstrating proposition th~ir injury, if any,
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necessarily occurred at the place where they were physically
resident. Any impact of harm, whether physical or mental,
must take effect upon a person at the place where the
person is located.
As indicated in the comment to Section 377 of the
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, "each state has legislative
jurisdiction to determine the legal effect of acts done or
. events caused within its territory. If the consequences of
an act done in one state occur in another state, each state
in which any event in the series of acts and consequences
occurs may exercise legislative jurisdiction to create rights
or other interests as a result thereof." Thus, in a privacy
action, both the state in which the exhibitions take place
and the state in which the injuries or legal consequences of
the exhibitions take place may have legislative jurisdiction
to impose an obligation to pay for harm caused thereby.
But legislative jurisdiction to create an obligation is one
thing; the problem of making a choice of law between several states each of which has exercised its proper legislative jurisdiction to create a liability is still another. As
stated in the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 65,
Comment b.:
"Under the rule stated * * * [and set
forth above], it may and frequently does happen
that more than one state has legislative jurisdiction
to attach rights or other interests to a series of
events started by a person's act. In an action
brought to enforce an obligation imposed by reason
of such series of events or in an action brought to
punish the actor, the court at the forum must select
the law of one of the several states thus having
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legislative jurisdiction, to govern the case * * *
The rules governing such choice are stated in Chapter 9."

Chapter 9 of the Restatement above referred to, begins with
.- Section 377 which defines the place of wrong as the state
~ where the injury takes place, and continues in Section 378
~- with the statement that the law of the place of wrong de' termines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.
With respect to a multi-state tort with incidents in
: several states such as alleged and proved in this case, each
~ state in which any one of these incidents occurs has legislative jurisdiction to create rights and liapilities with respect
to these acts and the consequences thereof. Furthermore,
each state is competent to enact such legislation without regard to the incidents of the tort which occur in the other
states involved. This does not mean, however, that each state
should apply the substantive law of the forum without regard to the rules of conflict of laws. When an action which
cuts across state lines is filed in one of these states, a court
sitting in that state must make a choice of applicable law
in accordance with the established conflict of laws rule of
the forum.
It is true that the plaintiffs contend that their cause
of action in this case is a statutory one, with its source and
genesis in Section 103-4-9 of the Utah Code Anno. (1943)
and that it is not based upon general law. However, the
question whether the plaintiffs' action ·is based upon a
statute or upon general law is immaterial to the conflict of
laws issue. As evidenced by the numerous authorities cited
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in the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Phillips of the
Tenth Circuit, in considering the conflict of laws problem
it makes no difference whether the respective rights are
created by the common law or by statute. If no cause of
action is created at the place of injury, no recovery can
be had in any other state. This is so even in a situation
where the cause- of action is -conferred by statute in the
- place where the action is brought, but is denied by the
common law of the state where the injury takes place. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 384. Illustrative of
this is the case of LeForest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109, 19
Am. Rep. 400, in which the plaintiff was bitten by a dog
which had strayed into the State of New Hampshire. The
dog was owned by the defendant, a resident of Massachusetts. Under the common law of New Hampshire, plaintiff
would not be entitled to recover; under a Massachusetts
statute recovery would be permitted. The plaintiff brought
an action in l\iassachusetts seeking recovery under the provisions of the Massachusetts law. It was held that since
the injury occurred in New Hampshire, the law of that
state governed and accordingly the action could not be
maintained. See also Hunter v. Derby Foods, Inc., 2 Cir.,
110 F. (2d) 970.

.

The brief of the plaintiffs on this point concedes that
the Utah conflict of laws rule, as well as other authorities
on the subject, provides that in a tort case the choice of
law is determined by the "place of wrong." Section 377
of the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, defines the "place of
wrong" as the state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place. In the usual
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situation, therefore, the last event necessary to make a tort
complete is the fact of injury to body or mind. Such is the
situation in the present case, where the plaintiffs' cause of
action is based upon an injury to their feelings and sensibilities. The amended complaint states that by reason of
the violation of plaintiffs' alleged rights they have been
"greatly vexed and annoyed and humiliated, and caused
great mental and physical suffering to their injury and
damage" (R. 51). No other type of damage is requested·
or mentioned. Under the provisions of the Utah privacy
statute nothing else could be requested or mentioned, since
the statute specifically conditions the right of recovery to
"any injuries sustained by reason of" the alleged violation.
Because of the fact that the amended complaint as well
as the language of the Utah statute specifically makes injury to feelings the last event necessary to complete the
alleged tort, there is no merit to the argument on page 98
of plaintiffs' brief concerning the conflict of laws rule in
defamation cases and its possible. application to right of
privacy actions. In defamation cases, the gravaman of the
tort is not injury to the feelings of the person defamed, ·but
rather injury to that person's reputation so far as third
persons are concerned. In defamation cases, the last event
necessary to complete the tort takes place where the libel
or slander is heard by third persons conversant with the
reputation of the person defamed. Ordinarily, this would
mean that the place of wrong in a defamation case is where
the statement was published or broadcast. But it is obvious
that an entirely different concept would be applicable to .
a privacy case, where, as under the Utah statute, injury
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to the person's feelings is an essential condition of the right
of recovery.
There is good reason and a wise policy for application
of the conventional Utah conflict of laws rule to the type
of factual situation set forth in the plaintiffs' amended
complaint. The rule supplies the virtues of simplicity and
uniformity to the solution of an otherwise complex problem. It avoids the necessity· in a multi-state tort case of
an examination and application of the law of the many different states where the alleged unlawful acts complained
of took place. In most instances, the rule that the law of
the place of injury governs, results in the application of
the law of the state where a plaintiff has physical status
(usually his place of residence) and therefore confers rights
in accordance with the policy a;nd law of· the community
.most ·intimately connected with a plaintiff. Of the several
conflict of law rules suggested by the authorities, it is the
most in accord with common sense as well as legal precedent.
The problem raised here is not-as plaintiffs would
like to pose it-whether a nonresident of Utah, who suffered injury to his feelings within Utah from an invasion
of his right of privacy in the name of his deceased ancestor
occurring within or without Utah, can invoke the Utah
statute. The problem is whether the State of Utah can by
statute create a right of action for injuries suffered by a
person in another state, on account of a wrongful act occurring in the State of Utah, the force of which reaches
beyond the territorial limits of Utah and into another state.
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And further, if Utah can create such an extra-territorial
right, not recognized at common law, whether the legislature intended to do so in enacting Sections 103-4-9 of the
Utah Code Anno. (1943). In answer, it is submitted that
if the Legislature had intended to give extra-territorial
effect to the Utah statute, it would have so stated by clear
and unambiguous language. It is an established principle
of long standing that no law has any effect of its own force
beyond the territorial limits of t_he sovereignty from which
its authority is derived. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113,
163, 16 S. Ct. 139; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th
Ed. Vol. 1, pp. 154, 248. Hence, the. presumption is that
a statute is intended to be confined in its operation and
effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmakers
have general and legitimate power. In Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, 195, 39 S. Ct. 84, 86, the Supreme
Court said: "Legislation is presumptively territorial and
confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has
jurisdiction."
As herein demonstrated, under the common law conflict of Iaws rule of Utab, the injury to plaintiffs' feelings,
if any, occurred in California and California was the place
of wrong and the rights of the plaintiff should be determined by the law of that state. Since this is the applicable
common law conflict of laws rule of Utah, it should not be
presumed that the legislature intended to overturn or abrogate it by Section 103-4-9, Utah Code Anno. (1943), unless such intent clearly appears, either by express declaration or by necessary implication. There is no legislative
history of any such intent and certainly no such intent is
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manifest from the language of the statute itself. In Niblock
v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 582, 111 P. (2d) 800, 804,
this Court said that where a statute imposes a liability not
recognized at common law, it will not be extended "further
than the clear intendment of the statute." And Carlo v.
Okonite-Callender Cable Co., 3 N. J. 253, 69A (2d) 734,
740, makes clear that "to affectuate any change in the
common law, the legislative intent to do so must be clearly
and plainly expressed."

CONCLUSION
For the reasons herein set forth, the Utah right of
privacy statute should be construed as inapplicable to motion pictures or other publications protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and the press; also
such expressions of free speech and the press should be held
not "trade" within the meaning or intent of the Utah statute; furtherrn_ore, the conflict of Iaws rule of Utab makes
the law of California determinative of the rights of the
plaintiffs. Therefore, the judgment entered on the jury
verdict of "no cause of action" should be affirmed, also
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the declaratory judgment entered at the conclusion of the
trial should be .a ffirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL,
&McCARTHY,
DENNIS McCARTHY,

Attorneys for Warner Brothers Pictures
Distributing Corporation and Intermountain Theatres, Inc.
C. VERNON LANGLOIS,

Attorney for Arch E. Overman and '
C. E. Overman.
R. W. PERKINS,
MORRIS EBENSTEIN,

Of Counsel.
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APPENDIX A

Some of the Motion Pictures in Which Famous Dead
People Have Been Portrayed Fictionally.
Hans Christian Anderson in Hans Christian Anderson, Goldwyn-RKO (1952).
Enrico Caruso in The Great Caruso, MGM (1951).
Toulouse Lautrec (Famous Artist) in Moulin Rouge,
United Artists (1952).
John Alden in Plymouth Adventure, MGM (1952).
Richard the Lion Hearted in Ivanhoe, MGM (1952).
Zapata (Mexican Revolutionist) in Viva Zapata,
20th Century (1952) ~
Gen. Rommel in Desert Fox, 20th Century Fox .
(1952).
John Phillip Sousa in Stars and Stripes Forever,
20th Century (1952).
I

Grace Moore (Famous Opera Singer) in· So This
is Love, Warner Bros. ( 1953) .
Colonel James Bowie (Inventor of the bowie knife)
in the Iron Mistress, Warner Bros. (1952).
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis in The
Magnificent Yankee, MGM (1950).
Abraham Lincoln and Ann Rutledge in Young Mr.
Lincoln, 20th-Fox (1939) ; and Abe Lincoln in
Illinois, RKO (1938).
Knute Rockne in Knute Rockne-All American,
Warner (1940).
Paul Dreiser (Author of "On the Banks of the Wa. bash") in My Gal Sal, 20th-Fox (1942).
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Enrico Caruso in The Great Caruso, MGM (1951) 0
Queen Victoria, Benjamin Disraeli in The Mudlark,
20th-Fox (1950) 0
Rudolph Valentino in The Life of Rudolph Valentino, Columbia (1951) o
Bill Cody ("Buffalo Bill") in Buffalo Bill, 20th-Fox
(1944) 0
Edith Cavell in Nurse Edith Cavell, RKO (1939)0
Texas Guinan in Incendiary Blonde, Paramount
(1945) 0
William Morton (Boston dentist who introduced the
use of anesthesia in 1836) in The Great Moment, Paramount ( 1944) o
Hiram Maxim (Inventor) in So Goes My Love, Universal ( 1946) o
Lillian Russell in Lillian Russell, 20th-Fox (1940)o
Daniel Decatur Emmett (Famed minstrel man and
author of Dixie) in Dixie, Paramount (1942)o
Louis Pasteur in The Story of Louis Pasteur, Warner (1935) o
Emile Zola in The Life of Emile Zola, Warner
(1940) 0
Woodrow Wilson in Wilson, 20th-Fox (1944) o
Thomas Edison in Edison the Man, MGM (1940);
and Young Tom Edison, MGM (1940)o
Theodore Roosevelt in The Rough Riders, Paramount
(1927).
General Custer in They Died With Their Boots On,
Warner (1941) o
Andrew Jackson in The Gorgeous Hussy, MGM
(1936).
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iii
Pearl White, Perils of Pauline, Paramount (1947).
Victor Herbert in The Great Victor Herbert, Paramount (1939).
Florence Nightingale in Lady With the Lamp, British (1951).
General Rommel in The Desert Fox, 20th-Fox
(1951).
Major Frank Cavanaugh in The Iron Major, RKO
(1943).
Charles Parnell in Parnell, MGM (1937).
The Rothschilds in The House of Rothschild, United
Artists (1934).
Benjamin Disraeli in Disraeli, Warner ( 1929) ; and
Disraeli, United Artists (1921).
Alexander Hamilton in Alexander Hamilton, Warner
(1931).
Madame Curie in Madame Curie, MGM (1943).
Jim Brady in Diamond Jim, Universal (1935).
Walter Reed in Yellow Jack, MGM (1938).
Crown Prince Rudolph and Baroness Mary Vetsera
in Mayer ling, French (1937).
Jim Corbett in Gentleman Jim, Warner (1942).
Chauncey Olcott, Lillian Russell in My Wild Irish
Rose, Warner (1947).
Johann Strauss, Jr., in. The Great Waltz, MGM
(1938).
Julius Reuters in Dispatch from Reuters, Warner
(1940).
Annie Oakley, Buffalo Bill in Annie Get Your Gun,
MGM (1950).
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Jack London in Jack London, United Artists (1943).
Robert and Clara Schuman in Song of Love, MGM
(1947).

Dempster MacMurphy (Chicago newspaper and utilities executive who engaged in philanthropic
work under the name of St. Dismas) in The
Hoodlum Saint, MGM (1945).
Amelia Earhart in Flight for Freedom, RKO (1943).
Mark Twain in Adventures of Mark T'wain, Warner
(1944).

Nora Bayes in Shine On Harvest Moon, Warner
(1944).

George Gershwin in Rhapsody in Blue, Warner
(1945).

Henry Dunant (Founder of the International Red
Cross) in Man to Men, French (1949).
Tony Pastor in Daughter of Rosie O'Grady, Warner
(1950).

The Barretts and Browning in The Barretts of Wimpole Street, MGM (1934).
The Daltons in The Daltons Ride Again, Universal
(1945); and When the Daltons Rode, Universal
(1940).

Rasputin in Rasputin and the Empress, MGM
(1932) ; Rasputin, Universal (1930) ; Rasputin,
German (1929); and Rasputin, the Black Monk,
Foreign ( 1917).
Sutter in Sutter's Gold, Universal (1936).
·Napoleon and Marie Walewska in Conquest, MGM
(1937); Napoleon, MGM (1929); and Napoleon
and Josephine, American ( 1924) .
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Jesse James, Frank James in Jesse James, 20th-Fox
(1939) ; Jesse James, Frank James in Jesse
James, Paramount ( 1927) .
Dr. Ehrlich in Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet, Paramount ( 1940) .
Alexander Hamilton in Alexander Hamilton, Warner
(1931).
Dr. Samuel Alexander Mudd (He aided John Wilkes
Booth) in The Prisoner of Shark Island, 20thFox (1936).
Bernadette in The Song of Bernadette, 20th-Fox
(1933).
Frederick Chopin in A Song to Remember, Columbia (1945).
Calamity Jane in Texan Meets Calamity Jane, Columbia (1950).
Cyrano de Bergerac in Cyrano de Bergerac, United
Artists (1950).
Joan of Arc in Joan·of Arc, RKO (1948).
Mother Cabrini in The Life and Miracles of Blessed
Mother Cabrini, American (1946).
Elizabeth and Essex in Private Lives of Elizabeth
and Essex, Warner (1939).
Charlotte and Emily Bronte in Devotion, Warner
(1946).
Alexander .Graham Bell in The Story of Alexander
Graham Bell, 20th-Fox (1939).
Boss Tweed in Up in Central Park, Universal
(1948).
Dolly Madison in The Magnificent Doll, Universal
(1946).
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Columbus in
(1949).

Christopher

Andrew Johnson in
(1942).

Columbus,

Universal

Tennessee Johnson, MGM
I'

Billy the Kid in The Kid From Texas, Universal
(1950) ; I Shot Billy the Kid, Lippert (1951);
The Outlaw, RKO (1947) ; and Billy the Kid,
MGM (1941).
John Montgomery (Aviation Pioneer) in Gallant
Journey, Columbia (1946).
Lou Gehrig in Pride of the Yankees, RKO (1942).
Peter Stuyvesant, Washington Irving in Knickerbocker Holiday, United Artists (1944).
Father Duffy in The Fighting 69th, Warner (1940).
Stephen Foster in

Swa~ee

River, 20th-Fox ( 1939).

Jacques Offenbach (Composer) in The Paris Waltz,
French, ( 1950) .
Marie Antoinette in Marie Antoinette, MGM (1938).
In recent years Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., have produced the following series of short motion pictures, in
which deceased public figures were portrayed fictionally
und'er their own names :
Theodore Roosevelt in T'eddy, the Rough Rider
(1940).
James Monroe, President Grover Cleveland, John
Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay
and Theodore Roosevelt in The Monroe Doctrine
(1939).
Abraham Lincoln in Lincoln in the White House
(1939).
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General "Stonewall" Jackson, Robert E. Lee in Under Southern Stars (1937).
Andrew Jackson, Mrs. Jackson, Abraham Lincoln in
Old Hickory (1939).
Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, Napoleon in The
Romance of Louisiana (1938).
Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams,
John Hancock in Declaration of Independence
.
(1938).
Thomas Jefferson in Bill-of Rights (1939).
Francis Scott Key, Mary Key in The Song of a Na. tion (1936).
Patrick Henry in Give Me Liberty (1936).
George Washington, Haym Salomon, Nathan Hale
in Sons of Liberty ( 1939).

Some of the Plays ·in Which Famous Dead People
Have Been Portrayed Fictionally.
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis in The
Magnificent Yankee, by Emmet Lavery (1946).
Anna Held, Lillian Russell (actresses); Diamond
Jim Brady (famous night-life figure of the Gay
Nineties) ; John L. Sullivan (prizefighter), and
Steve Brody (the man who jumped off Brooklyn Bridge) in Hold Your Horses, by Russel
Crouse and Corey Ford (1933).
Boss Tweed and Thomas N ast in Up In Central
Park, by Herbert and Dorothy Fields. Music
by Sigmund Romberg. (1945).
Nellie Bly (Reporter) in Nellie Bly, by Jack Emman'
uel. Music by Johnny Burke and James Van
Heusen (1946).
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Abraham Lincoln and Ann Rutledge in Spirit of Ann
Rutledge, by H. W. Gammans and Abe Lincoln
in Illinois, by Robert E. Sherwood .(1938); and
in Prologue to Glory, by E. P. Conkle (1938).
Abraham Lincoln in Abraham Lincoln, by John
Drinkwater (1919) ; and in If Booth Had
Missed, by Arthur Goodman (1932) ; and in
Yours, A. Lincoln, by Paul Horgan (1942); and
in War President, by Nat Sherman (1944); and
in A Man of the People, by Thomas Dixon
( 1920) ; and in The Mantle of Lincoln, by Test
Dalton (1926).
John Wilkes Booth in The Man Who Killed Lincoln,
· by Elmer Harris ( 1940) .
Annie Oakley (famous markswoman and circus performer) in Annie Get Your Gun, by Herbert
and Dorothy Fields. Music by Irving Berlin
(1946).

Oscar
Wilde, Frank Harris ,in 'oscar Wilde, by Leslie
.
and Sewell Stokes ( 1938) .
Walter Reed in Yell ow Jack, by Sidney Howard in
collaboration with Paul de Kruif (1934).
Emily Dickinson in Eastward in Eden, by Dorothy
Gardner (1947).
Mary Surratt (She was innocently convicted for conspiring in the murder of Abraham Lincoln) in
The Story of Mary Surratt, by Russell Lewis and
Howard Young (1947).
Woodrow Wilson in In Time to Come, by Howard
Koch and John Huston (1941).
Benjamin Disraeli in Disraeli, by Louis N. Parker
(1917).

Benjamin Disraeli in Young Mr. Disraeli, by Elswyth Thane (1937).
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Charles Dickens in The Ivy Green, by Mervyn Nelson
(1949).
Charles Dickens in Romantic Mr. Dickens, by H. H.
and Marguerite Harper (1940).
P. T. Barnum, Capt. Kidd, Henry VIII, Cleopatra,
Salome in Houseboat on the Styx, by Kenneth
Webb and John E. Hazzard (1928), (From the
novel by Jerome K. Jerome) .
Crown Prince Rudolph and Marie Vetsera in Marinka, by George Marion, Jr. and Karl Farkas.
Music by Emmerick Kalman (1945).
Emperor Franz Joseph of _Austria-Hungary and
Empress Elizabeth, Crown Prince Rudolph,
Baroness Mary Vetsera in The Masque of Kings,
by Maxwell Anderson (1937).
Parnell, Gladstone, Capt. William O'Shea, Katharine
O'Shea in Parnell, by Elsie Schauffler ( 1935).
Edvard Grieg in Song of Norway; operetta by Milton Lazarus, from a Play ·by Homer Curran
(1944).
Johann Strauss, Jr. in Mr. Strauss Goes to Boston,
by Leonard L. Levenson. Mu~ic by Robert Stolz
and Robert Sour (1945).
Johann Strauss, Sr. and Johann Strauss, Jr. in The_
Great Waltz, by Moss Hart (1934).
Queen Victoria, Benjamin Disraeli · in Victoria
Regina, by Laurence Housman (1938).
Gilbert and Sullivan, Queen Victoria, Oscar Wilde,
Crown Prince Wilhelm, Whistler in Knights of
Song, by Glendon Allvine (1938).
Florence Nightingale in The Lady With the Lamp,
by Reginald Berkeley ( 1931) .
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Edgar Allan Poe in Plumes in the Dust, by Sophie
Treadwell (1936).
Franz Schubert in Blossom Time, adapted by Dorothy Donnelly from the original of Willner and
Reichert. Music adapted by Sigmund Romberg
from the melodies of Franz Schubert and H.
Berte (1921).
John Brown in Battle Hymn, by M. Blankfort and
M. Gold (1936).
John Brown in John Brown, by Ronald Gow (1934).
Jefferson Davis in Jefferson Davis, by John McGee
(1936).

Harriet Beecher Stowe in American Landscape, by
Elmer Rice ( 1938) .
Daniel Webster in The Devil and Daniel Webster,
by Stephen Vincent Benet and Douglas Moore
(1939).

Lord Byron in Bright Rebel, by Stanley Young
(1938).

The Barretts and Robert Browning in The Barretts
of Wimpole Street, by Rudolf Besier (1931).
Charlotte and Emily Bronte in Moor Born, by Dan
Totheroh (1934).
Harriet Beecher Stowe (and several members of the
Stowe and Beecher families) in Harriet, by
Florence Ryerson ( 1943) .
Aaron Burr in Colonel Satan, by Booth Tarkington
(1931).

Elisa Bowen ("Mme. J umel"), Stephen J umel,
Aaron Burr in Great Lady, by Earle Crooker
and Lowell Brentano ( 1938) .
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George Washington, Lafayette, Major Andre, Sir
\'Villiam Howe in Valley Forge, by Maxwell
Anderson (1934).
Nathan Hale in Death of Capt. Nathan Hale, by D.
Trumbull.
George Washington in George Washington, by Percy
Mackaye ( 1920).
Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, James Monroe in The
Patriots, by Sidney Kingsley (1943).
Franz, Duke of Reichstadt in L' Aiglon, by Edmond
Rostand (1934).
Napoleon Bonaparte in St. Helena, by R. C. Sherriff
and Jeanne de Casalis ( 1936) .
Napoleon Bonaparte in Dynasts, by Thomas Hardy.
Empress Josephine, in Napi, by Brian Marlow
(1931).
Napoleon and Josephine in Her Man of Wax, by
Julian Thompson (1933).
Marie Antoinette in Marie Antoinette, by Upton Sinclair (1939).
Marie Antoinette, Joseph II, Emperor of Austria in
Madame Capet, by George Middleton (1938).
Georges Jacques Danton, Robes pierre · in Danton's
Death, translated by G. Dunlop, from the German of George Buchner (1938).
Catherine the Great in Catherine Was Great, by Mae
West (1944).
Peter Stuyvesant, Washington Irving in Knickerbocker Holiday, by Maxwell Anderson (1938).
Du Barry and Louis XIV in Du Barry Was a Lady
(1939).
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xii
Johann Goethe in Frederika, by Franz Lebar
(1937).
Keats, Shelley, Byron and Fanny Brawne in Aged
26, by Anne Crawfo~d Flexner (1936).
Anne, Queen of England ("Mrs. Morley"), John
Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough, Sarah,
Duchess of Marlborough in Anne of England,
by Mary Cass Canfield and Ethel Borden
(1941).
King James II in The O'Flynn, by Brian Hooker and
Russell Janney, from Justin H. McCarthy's
Novel and Play (1934).
George Sand, Chopin, Liszt, Heine in White Lilacs,
by Sigurd Johannsen ( 1928) .
Queen Elizabeth and Essex in Gloriana, by Ferdinand Bruckner (1938).
Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn in Anne of the Thousand Days, by Maxwell Anderson (1948).
William Shakespeare in Second Best Bed, by N.
Richard Nash (1946).
Benvenuto Cellini in The Firebrand of Florence, by
Edwin Justin Mayer and Ira Gershwin. Music
by Kurt Weil (1945).
Benvenuto Cellini in The Firebrand, by Edwin Justin Mayer (1924).
Queen Elizabeth, Essex, Bacon, Raleigh in Elizabeth
the Queen, by Maxwell Anderson ( 1930).
Mary, Queen of Scots in Mary of Scotland, by Maxwell Anderson ( 1933).
Joan of Arc in Joan of Lorraine, by Maxwell Anderson (1946).
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Cyrano de Bergerac in Cyrano de Bergerac, by Edmond Rostand (1898, 1st production in U. S.
A.)

Francois Villon in The Vagabond King (1925).
Christopher Columbus, Queen Isabella of Spain,
King Ferdinand in Christopher Comes Across,
by Hawthorne Hurst (1932).
Richard II, Duke of Gloucester in Richard of Bordeaux, by Gordon Daviot (1934).
Cesare Borgia, Macchiavelli in The Tyrant, by
Rafael Sabatini (1930).
King Arthur in A Connecticut Yankee. A musical
adaptation of Mark Twain's novel. Music by
Rodgers and Hart (1927). ·
Thomas A. Becket (Archbishop of Canterbury} in
Murder in the Cathedral, by T. S. Eliot (1936).
Cardinal Richelieu, Louis XIII in The Red Robe.
From the novel by Stanley Weyman (1928).

Some of the Novels in Which Famous Dead People
Have Been Portrayed Fictionally.
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 0 Shepherd Speak!, by
Upton Sinclair (1949).
Napoleon in War and Peace, by Leo Tolstoy (1869).
Vincent Van Gogh in Lust for Life, by I. Stone
(1934).
Mrs. Jack Gardner and John Singer Sargent in The
Lady and the Painter, by Countess Eleanor
Palffy (1951).
Emily Dickinson in Come Slowly, Eden, by L. Benet
(1942).
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Abraham Lincoln in The Soul of Ann Rutledge, by
Bernie Babcock (1919).
Theodore Roosevelt in Rich Man, Poor Man, by Mrs.
J. A. Fairbank (1936).
Andrew Jackson and his Rachel in The President's
Lady, by Irving Stone ( 1951).
William Jennings Bryan in 42nd Parallel, by John
R. Dos Passos.
Anna Ella Carroll (A lawyer and the brainy woman
behind Lincoln) in Woman With a Sword, by
H. Noble (1948).
Queen Victoria in The Mudlark, by T. Bonnet
(1949).
Ulysses S. Grant in The Crisis, by Winston Churchill (1901).
Goethe and his Lotte of Weimar in The Beloved Returns, by Thomas Mann.
Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett in Miss
Barrett's Elopement, by Mrs. C. M. A. 0. Lenanton (1930).
Washington in The Virginians, by W. M. Thackeray.
Thomas Carlyle in Speaking Dust, by Mrs. E. P.
Thorton-Cook ( 1938).
Shelley in Orphan Angel, by Mrs. E. H. Wylie
(1926).
Charlotte and Emily Bronte in These Were the
Brontes, by D. H. Cornish (1940).
Louisa May Alcott in 0 Genteel Lady!, by E. Forbes
(1926).
Samuel Johnson in Dr. Sam: Johnson, Detector, by
L. De La Torre-Bueno (1946).
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Jonathan Swift in Violent Friends, by W. Clewes
(1945).
Robert Burns in Immortal Lover, by J. A. Steuart
(1929)-.
Shakespeare in Master Skylark, by J. Bennett.
Alexander Hamilton, Washington, Madison, Adams
in The Conqueror, by Gertrude Atherton.
Byron· in Glorious Apollo, by Mrs. L. M. A. Beck
(1925).
Lord Nelson and Lady Hamilton in Divine Lady, by
Mrs. L. M. A. Beck ( 1936).
Keats in Special Hunger, by G. O'Neil (1931).
Charles Lamb, Mary Lamb in So Perish the Roses,
by S. Southwold (1940).

..

Numerous novels have been written concerning most
of the above named deceased public figures. The novels
listed above are merely instances. Needless to say, thousands
of similar novels have been written concerning numberless
other deceased public figures .

"

APPENDIX B
The following extracts are from the book A Guide to
the Best Historical Novels and Tales by Jonathan Nield
(published by Elkin Mathews & Marrot, London, 1929).
"These Historical Novels have taught all men
this truth, which looks like a truism, and yet was
as good as unknown to writers of history and others,
till so taught: that the bygone ages of the world
were actualy filled by living men, not by. protocols,
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xvi

state-papers,
men."

controversies,

and

abstractions of

Carlyle on the Waverley

Nov~.

"Those who know very little of the past and
care very little for the future, will make but a sorry
business of the present. * * * The great Duke
of Marlborough said that he had learnt all the history he ever knew out of Shakespeare's histo:rical
plays. I have long thought that if we persuaded
those classes who have to fight their own little battles of Blenheim for bread every day, to make such
a beginning of. history as is furnished by Shakespear's plays and Scott's novels, we should have done
more to imbue them with a real interst in the past
of mankind than if we had taken them through a
course of Hume and Smollett, or Hallam on the
English Constitution, or even the dazzling Macaulay."
Lord Morley on "The Great
Commonplaces of Reading."
"I take up a volume of Dr. Smollett or a volume
of The Spectator, and say the fiction carries a
greater amount of truth in solution than the volume
which purports to be all true."
.William Makepeace Thackeray.
"Epitomes are not narratives, as skeletons are
not human figures. Thus records of prime truths
remain a dead letter to plain folk; the writers have
.left, so much to the imagination, and imagination
is so rare a gift. Here, then, the writer of fiction
may be of use to the public-as an interpreter."
Charles Reade, in "The Cloister and the Hearth.''
"What, after all, can we know about the way in
which men felt so long ag~Cavaliers or Crusaders
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or Romans? But the answer to that is another question. What can we know about the way in which
men feel now? The dust of modernity is as thick
as the drift of the ages-the only difference is that
it has not settled: and still 'we mortal millions live
alone.' Every narrative is creation, because under•
standing is itself a creative act; the strictest history
is born dead unless it burns and breathes with imagination from within; if the p~st is only because it
was, moment by moment that becomes true of the
present also; realism and romance are not two different things ; the test of any story, scientific, poetic, ancient, modern or futurist, is simply that it
convinces."

Gerald Gould in "The English Novel of To-day."
"Sir Walter Scott is dead. Long live Sir Walter
Scott! His great discovery that fiction and history
are interchangeable is a basic patent, bound to reappear and reappear in the history of literature
. * * * Not psychology, not realism, not the .most
intense modernism can kill the historical romance."

Henry Seidel Canby in "Tke Saturday
Review of Literature."
(New York.)
The following extracts are from Mr. Nield's Introduction to the above book :

* * *

For many years I have been an assiduous reader of novels and tales in which the historical element appeared, supplementing my own reading in this direction by a careful study of all that I
could find in the way of criticism on such works
and their writers. Only in this way could I venture
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xviii
on a selection involving a survey of several thousand
volumes! * * *
I think many will be surprised to find how
large a proportion of our best writers (English and
American) have entered the domain of Historical
or Semi-Historical Romance~ Scott, Peacock, Thackeray, Dickens, Hawthorne, George Eliot, Charlotte
Bronte, George Meredith, Thomas Hardy, R. L.
Stevenson, Charles Kingsley, Henry Kingsley,
Charles Reade, George Macdonald, Anthony Trollope, Mrs. Gaskell, Walter Besant, Lytton, Disraeli,
J. H. Newman, J. A. Froude, and Walter Paterthese are a few of the names which appear in the
following pages; while Tolstoy, Dumas, Balzac,
"George Sand," Victor Hugo, "De Stendhal" (Henri
Beyle), De Vigny, Prosper Merimee, Flaubert,
Theophile Gautier, Alphonse Daudet, "Anatole
Yrance," Freytag, Scheffel, Hauff, Auerbach, Felix
Dahn, Georg Ebers, Hausrath, Manzoni, Perez
Galdos, Merezhkovsky, Topeli us, Sienkiewicz, and
Jokai are, perhaps, the chief amongst those representing Literatures other than our own.
"An Egyptian Princess," "Quo Vadis ?," "The
Last Days of Pompeii," "The Gladiators," "Hypatia," "Harold," "Ivanhoe," "The Talisman,"
"Maid Marian," "The Forest Lovers," "Quentin
Durward," "Romola," "The Cloister and the
Hearth," "The Abbot," "Westward Ho !" "Kenilworth," "The Chaplet of PearIs," "A Gentleman of
France," "By Order of the Company," "The Splendid
Spur," "John lnglesant," "Under the Red Robe,"
"The Three Musketeers," "Twenty Years After,"
"The Viscomte de Bragelonne," "Maiden and Married Life of Mary Powell," "A Legend of Montrose,"
"John Splendid," " Old Mortality," "John Burnet of
Barns," "The Betrothed" (1 Promessi Sposi), "Lorna Doone," "The Refugees," "The Old Dominion,"
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"The Courtship of Morrice Buckler," "Dorothy
Forster," "The Raiders," "Rob Roy," "Esmond,"
"The Virginians/' "Heart of Midlothian;" "Waverley," "The Master of Ballantrae," "Kidnaped,"
"Catriona," "The Chaplain of the Fleet," "The Seats
of the Mighty," "Richard Carvel," "Ninety-three"
(L' An '93), "War and Peace," "Revolution in Tanner's Lane," "Vittoria"-what visions do these mere
titles arouse within many of us! And, though most
of the books given in my list cannot be described in
the same glowing terms as the masterpieces just
named, yet many "nests of pleasant thoughts" may
be formed through .their companionship. * * *
Perhaps this introduction may be most fitly concluded by something in the nature of apology for
Historical Romance itself. Not only has fault been
found with the deficiencies of unskilled authors in
that department, but the question has been asked by
one or two critics of standing-What right has the
Historical Novel to exist at all? More often than
not, it is pointed out, the Romanticist gives us a
mass of inaccuracies, which, while they mislead the
ignorant (i. e., the majority), are an unpardonable
offence to the historically-minded reader. Moreover,
the writer of such Fiction, though he be a Thackeray
or a Scott, cannot surmount barriers which are not
merely hard to scale, but absolutely impassable. The
spirit of a period is like the selfhood of a human
being-something that cannot be handed on; try as
we may, it is impossible for us to breathe the atmosphere of a bygone time, since all those thousandand-one details which went to the building up of
both individual and general experience, can never be
reproduced. We consider (say) the Eighteenth Century from the purely Historical standpoint, and,
while we do so, are under no delusion as to our limitations; we know that a few of the leading person-
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ages and events have been brought before us in a
more or less disjointed fashion, and are perfectly
aware that there is room for much discrepancy between the· picture.s so presented to us (be it with
immense skill) and the actual facts as they took
· place in such and such a year. But, goes on the obj ector, in the case of a Historical Romance we allow
ourselves to be hoodwinked, for, under the influence
of a pseudo-historic security, we seem to watch the
real sequence of events in so far as these affect the
characters in whom we are interested. How we
seem to live in those early years of the Eighteenth
Century, as we follow Henry Esmond from point to
point, and yet, in truth, we are breathing not the
atmosphere of Addison and Steele, but the atmosphere created by the brilliant Nineteenth Century
_ Novelist, partly out of his erudite conception of a
former period, and partly out of the emotions and
thoughts engendered by that very environment
which was his own, and from which he could not
'
escape! * * *
·
Again, if it be true that the novelist cannot reproduce the far past in any strict sense, it is also
true that neither can he so reproduce the life and
events of yesterday. That power of imaginative
memory, which all exercise in daily experience, may
be held in very different de·grees, but its enjoyment
is not dependent on accuracy of representationfor, were this so, none of us would possess it. In
an analogous manner the writer of Romance may
be more or less adequately equipped on the side of
History pure and simple, but he need not wait for
that which will never come-the power of reproducing in toto a past age. If, in reading what purports
to be no more than a Novel, the struggle between
Christianity and Paganism (for example), or the
unbounded egotism of Napoleon, be brought more
vividly .before our minds-and this may be done by
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suggestion as well as by exact relation-then, I
would maintain, we are to some extent educated
historically, using the word in a large though perfectly legitimate sense.

* * * The Historical Novel exists primarily
as Fiction, and, even though in our waking moments

we may be persuaded of the unreality of that '
"dream" which a Scott or a Dumas has produced
for us, we shall still be able to place ourselves again
and again under the spell of their delightful influence. 1\ioreover, while admitting Dumas' carelessness of exact detail, it would hardly be contended
by the most sceptical that his works (still less those
of Scott) are without any background of Historic
suggestiveness. Scott, indeed, shows signs of having possessed something of that "detachment" which
is one important qualification in the Historian
proper ; there is a fairness and prevision .in his historical judgments which we look for in vain when
reading the works of his contemporaries. * * *
Thus, as regards History, where the textbook fails
in arousing interest, the tale may succeed, and, once
the spirit of inquiry has been stimulated, half the
battle is gained. In saying this, I am far from wishing to imply that the reading of romances can ever
take the place of genuine historical study. I know
well that such a book as Green's "Short History of
the English People" may prove to some young stu-.
dents more fascinating than any novel. There are,
however, cases in which recourse may be had to a
high-class work of fiction for the attainment of a
truer historic sense; while, taken only as supplement to more strictly Academic reading, such a
work may prove to have its uses. If, besides being
of help to teachers, my recommendations should lead
in any degree to further appreciation of the great
masters of Romance, the very large amount of lab-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

xxii
our expended over the preparation of this "Guide"
will be amply rewarded.
J. N.
II

The following extracts are from the book A Guide to
Historical Fiction by Ernest A. Baker, M. A., D. Lit. (published by George Routledge & Sons, Limited, London-The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1914). These extracts are
taken from Dr. Baker's Introduction to his book.

* * *

Historical fiction is not history, but
it is often better than history. A fine historical
painting, a pageant, or a play, may easily teach more
and carry a deeper impression than whole chapters
of description and analysis. Esmond and Tom Jones
are indispensable adjuncts to Lecky. Scott and
Dumas will always have a larger history class than
any two regular historians you could name. Even
a second-rate historical novel may have ample excuse for existence. But a good one-good, that is,
merely as a story-though chronology may be at
fault and facts inaccurately stated, will probably
succeed in making a period live in the imagination
when text-books merely give us dry bones.
So much for the educational aspect; but there
is another. An historical study, though in the form
of fiction, may have a positive value as a contribution to knowledge. Just as a portrait or a statue
by a great imaginative genius lifts a veil or furnishes a lens by which we gaze into the depths of
character, and see problems and enigmas suddenly
grow clear, so a great work of fiction-Shakespeare's Cleopatra, Mr. Bernard Shaw's Caesar, Mr.
Hewlett's Mary Stuart, or certain of the biographi-
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cal studies catalogued in the following pages which
it would be invidious to single out, based on original
research, and depicting their characters not merely
as statesmen or politicians, but as living people, with
personal as well as public interests, with ordinary
frailties and workaday inconsistencies-gives the
historical student a bird's-eye view where previously
his sight has been obstructed by details. * * *
The groundwork of the genuine historical romance-melodrama masquerading as historical can
be left out of account-is as sincere and valid reconstruction as the best efforts of the serious historian, and much the same methods are employed.
Neither can possibly be more than an approximation
to the reality; neither can help us to anything but
a partial realization of the past which is no more.
This, it has been pointed out over and over again,
is, in its fullness and vitality, utterly beyond our
grasp. We can never put ourselves in the place of
an early Victorian, much less of an Elizabethan or
a man of the Stone Age. Mental associations are
impossible to put. off. \Ve should have to cultivate
complete amnesia and begin life again, to get more
than a faint and rudimentary idea of what our remote ancestors really thought and felt.
It is worth while noticing that we unconsciously
put history and fiction on ·equal terms when, for
example, we compare Scott's Graham of Claverhouse
with Macaulay's. * * *
Reconstruction of bygone days-people, manners, ways of life, historical events-is the main
business of a goodly proportion among the later
novels enumerated in the following pages. In the
finest historical novel of the last thirty years Tolstoy's War and Peace-the past is portrayed as
if it were the present. * * *
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Mr. Sabatini is an authoritative historian of the
Borgias ; Mr. Hutton qualified by research and substantial monographs before he wrote Sigismondo
Pandolfo Malatesta; and Mrs. Atherton frankly
states that she originally intended to write an orthodox life of Alexander Hamilton, but, fortunately,
decided, when she came to put pen to paper, to direct
her powers of imaginative interpretation and reconstruction to the more genial task of placing her hero
in the true human perspective in Tke Conqueror.

* * *
* * * Of historical fiction written for a
purpose the output has been huge, though the bulk
of it is produced under false pretences. Religious
propaganda or apologetics probably accounts for
the largest amount, and politics comes next. The
mid-Victorian Sunday-school stories about the early
Christians typify the didactic class, and Monsignor
Benson's studies of the Reformation and the persecution of Catholics are among the best of the controversial. Patriotism was the inspiration of Westward Ho! and also, in a more deliberate and calculated way, of Mr. Standish O'Grady's Bog of Stars.
Several of Kingsley's romances were highly polemical in character, and those of his adversary Newman
were obviously meant to inculcate Catholic doctrine.
Quite a number of modern examples will be found
of the kind of romance, like The aomans of Partenay
and Ponthus et Sidoyne, so common in the Middle
Ages, the glorification of a family, sometimes of the
writer's own house.
As the index shows, the number of Americans
writing historical fiction is portentous, especially
for a country which has been alleged to have no
history. Their attention is not concentrated, however, on destroying this fallacy; French, Italian,
Greek, Russian, and Scandinavian history has been
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ransacked for subjects by American authors, who
have also produced many remarkable studies of the
English Civil War time and other periods. Personal
reminiscence plays a significant part in a great
many American novels. * * *
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